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ETTERS of credit1 have been facilitating commercial transac-
tions2 since at least the 1100s, 3 and quite possibly for hundreds, if
not thousands, of years more. 4 Today, at any given time, hundreds
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1. A letter of credit is "a definite undertaking... by an issuer to a beneficiary at the
request or for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial institution, to itself
or for its own account, to honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an
item of value." U.C.C. § 5-102(10) (1995); see also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l
Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. 1979) ("The engagement is a letter of credit if the issuer
has a primary obligation that is dependent solely upon presentation of conforming docu-
ments and not upon the factual performance or nonperformance by the parties to the un-
derlying transaction."); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500,
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 2 (1993) [hereinafter
UCP500] (defining a letter of credit as "any arrangement, however named or described,
whereby a bank (the 'Issuing Bank') acting at the request of a customer (the 'Applicant')
or on its own behalf," inter alia, "is to make a payment to or to the order of a third party
(the 'Beneficiary')").
2. Letters of credit facilitate commercial transactions "by providing the credit of a
third party, usually a bank, as an independent guarantee of payment to protect the parties.
The certainty of payment ... encourages hesitant parties to enter into transactions, by
providing them with a secure source of credit." AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Martin, 559 So. 2d
1058, 1062 (Ala. 1990) (paraphrasing Christopher Leon, Letters of Credit: A Primer, 45
MD. L. REV. 432, 432 (1986)).
3. A number of sources date the origins of letters of credit to the l100s. See, e.g.,
Republic Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d at 113; Leon, supra note 2, at 433; Paul R. Verkuil, Bank
Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716, 716 n.1 (1979); Richard A.
Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus. LAW. 495, 495
(1965).
4. Other sources date the origins of letters of credit much earlier. See Moog World
Trade Corp. v. Bancomer, S.A., 90 F.3d 1382, 1385 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Letters of credit have
been used for nearly 3000 years."); WILBERT WARD & HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS
AND ACCEPTANCES 145 (4th ed. 1958) (suggesting 575 B.C. as a likely starting date for the
use of letters of credit); Wiley, supra note 3, at 495 (suggesting that letters of credit may
date "as far back as the time of the Phoenicians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Greeks");
Rufus James Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARV. L. REV. 981,




of billions of dollars worth of commercial5 and standby6 letters of credit
are outstanding. 7 In the words of a recent opinion by the New York
Court of Appeals, "[t]he importance of letters of credit in international
trade and financing cannot be overstated."'8
In a typical commercial transaction, a buyer and a seller agree that the
buyer will purchase goods or services from the seller, for cash or on
credit, and that the seller will provide the buyer with those goods or ser-
vices in exchange for the buyer's payment or promise to pay. Each party
undertakes an obligation to the other in expectation of a benefit to be
conferred by the other. These obligations are mutually dependent, such
that one party's failure to perform may excuse the other party from per-
forming.9 A letter of credit transaction introduces a third party-the let-
ter of credit "issuer" 10-and two additional undertakings-or, as one
leading commentator describes them, "relationships"' '-to the
transaction.
The first undertaking in a letter of credit transaction is the underlying
contract between the buyer and the seller, which is now conditioned on
the buyer arranging for a letter of credit on the seller's behalf.12 If the
letter of credit is a commercial letter of credit, the underlying contract is
for the sale of goods.13 If the letter of credit is a standby letter of credit,' 4
then the underlying contract may be a promissory note or similar obliga-
5. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
7. See James E. Byrne, Overview of Letter of Credit Law & Practice in 2000, in AN-
NUAL SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW & PRACTICE 3 n.1 (James E. Byrne & Christo-
pher S. Byrnes, eds., 2001) (estimating standby and commercial letters of credit outstand-
ing by U.S. issuers and by non-U.S. issuers to U.S. beneficiaries in the third quarter of 2000
in excess of $700 billion); see also LC Statistics: 2nd Quarter 2002, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT
WORLD, Oct. 2002, at 23-33 (reporting $281.7 billion and $146.9 billion outstanding
standby and commercial letters of credit issued by 300 leading U.S. banks and 226 leading
U.S. branches or agencies of non-U.S. banks, respectively); Prefatory Note to U.C.C. Re-
vised Article 5 (1995) (commenting that, as of 1995, "nearly $500 billion standby letters of
credit are issued annually worldwide, of which $250 billion are issued in the United
States").
8. Nissho Iwai Europe PLC v. Korea First Bank, 782 N.E.2d 55, 58 n.1 (N.Y. 2002).
9. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-703(a), (f) (1989) (empowering the seller, inter alia, to with-
hold delivery of goods or to cancel the contract if the buyer fails to perform as promised);
id. § 2-711(1) (empowering the buyer, inter alia, to cancel the contract if the seller fails to
perform as promised).
10. Article 5 defines an "issuer" as "a bank or other person that issues a letter of
credit, .. . not includ[ing] an individual who makes an engagement for personal, family, or
household purposes." U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(9) (1995); see also UCP500, supra note 1, art. 2;
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 590, INTERNATIONAL STANDBY
PRACTICES ISP98 R. 2.01(a) (1998) [hereinafter ISP98].
11. See 1 JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETT-ERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND
STANDBY CREDITS T 2.01 (rev. ed. 2003).
12. See Gerald T. McLaughlin, Exploring Boundaries: A Legal and Structural Analysis
of the Independence Principle of Letter of Credit Law, 119 BANKINo L.J. 501, 506-07
(2002).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 47-51.
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tion to pay money between a borrower and a lender, 15 or a contract for
the purchase and sale of goods or services between a buyer and a seller.16
The second undertaking is between the buyer (in this context, the "ap-
plicant" 17) and the letter of credit issuer, in which the issuer agrees to
issue the letter of credit in favor of the seller (in this context, the "benefi-
ciary" 18) in exchange for the applicant's agreement to reimburse the is-
suer for any amounts the issuer disburses to the beneficiary on the letter
of credit.' 9 Issuers often require applicants to pledge collateral to secure
their promise to reimburse the issuer if the issuer has to honor the letter
of credit.20
The third undertaking, the letter of credit itself, is the issuer's promise
to pay the beneficiary when the beneficiary presents certain required doc-
uments21 or demands payment. 22 This third undertaking is independent
of the other two:
Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary ... under a letter
of credit are independent of the existence, performance, or nonper-
formance of a contract or arrangement out of which the letter of
credit arises or which underlies it, including contracts or arrange-
ments between the issuer and the applicant and between the appli-
cant and the beneficiary. 23
15. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1979)
(involving a standby letter of credit issued against proof of default on a promissory note).
16. See, e.g., B.E.I. Int'l, Inc. v. Thai Military Bank, 978 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1992) (in-
volving a standby letter of credit issued to "counterguarantee" the applicant's obligation to
produce and deliver weapon systems to the beneficiary of the standby letter).
17. Article 5 defines an "applicant" to be someone "at whose request or for whose
account a letter of credit is issued," including someone "who requests an issuer to issue a
letter of credit on behalf of another if the person making the request undertakes an obliga-
tion to reimburse the issuer." U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(2) (1995); see also UCP500, supra note 1,
art. 2; ISP98, supra note 10, R. 1.09(a).
18. Article 5 defines "beneficiary" to be "a person who under the terms of a letter of
credit is entitled to have its complying presentation honored," including "a person to
whom drawing rights have been transferred under a transferable letter of credit." U.C.C.
§ 5-102(a)(3); see also UCP500, supra note 1, art. 2(i); ISP98, supra note 10, R. 1.09(a),
1. 11(c) (i).
19. See McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 507-08.
20. See 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, $ 9.02[1].
21. See McCormack v. Citibank, N.A., 100 F.3d 532, 537 (8th Cir. 1996) ("To draw on
a documentary letter of credit, the beneficiary of that credit must present the issuing bank
with whatever documentation that is called for by the express terms of the credit."); see,
e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 116 (Tex. 1979) (hold-
ing that the issuer was obliged to honor a documentary letter of credit that conditioned
payment on "presentation of a properly drawn draft [and] four specific documents" where,
in fact, the successor beneficiary had presented a properly drawn draft and the four speci-
fied documents).
22. See McCormack, 100 F.3d at 537-38 ("[T]o draw on a clean letter of credit, the
beneficiary must merely demand payment; no documentation, other than perhaps a written
demand for payment, is required."); see, e.g., id. at 539-40 (finding that the bank had prop-
erly honored the beneficiary's demand for payment, where the letter of credit provided
that the bank would pay the beneficiary "upon receipt of your first written demand ....
either in the form of a tested telex or a letter"). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11,
2.05[11 & G-8.
23. U.C.C. § 5-103(d); see also UCP500, supra note 1, art. 3; ISP98, supra note 10, R.
1.07. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 508-09; Gerald T. McLaughlin, Letters of
2003] 2237
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As a result, an issuer normally 24 cannot refuse to honor a beneficiary's
conforming presentation 25 (or, in the case of a "clean" letter of credit, a
beneficiary's draft or demand for payment 26 ) based on some infirmity in
the beneficiary's performance of its contract with the applicant 27 or in the
Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence Principle, 48 OHio ST. L.J.
1197, 1206-07 (1989).
"Since by its very nature a letter of credit is ... independent of the underlying transac-
tion, it necessarily follows that there is no legal distinction between a letter of credit issued
before, after, or concomitantly with the consummation of the underlying transaction." Re-
public Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d at 116.
24. Article 5 recognizes two limited exceptions to the general rule prohibiting an is-
suer from refusing to honor a conforming presentation based on some infirmity in the
beneficiary's performance of its contract with the applicant. Section 5-109(a)(2) permits an
issuer to dishonor a facially conforming presentation if the issuer has a good faith belief
that honoring the presentation "would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the
issuer or applicant." U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(2); see, e.g., Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v.
Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 1153, 1164-65 (D. Mass. 1994); Prairie State Bank v.
Universal Bonding Ins. Co., 953 P.2d 1047, 1052-53 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); Takeo Co. v.
Mead Paper, Inc., 611 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (all applying section 5-
109(a)(2)'s predecessor, former section 5-114(2)(b)); see also Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (applying pre-Code common law
to reach the same result). Section 5-109(b) also entitles an applicant to seek an injunction
against the issuer from a court of competent jurisdiction if the applicant can show that
"honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the ...
applicant." U.C.C. § 5-109(b). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 1 4.03[6][b].
The UCP500 are silent on the issue of fraud; whereas the ISP98 explicitly defer to other
applicable law on questions of fraud, abuse, and similar defenses to honor. See ISP98,
supra note 10, R. 1.05(c).
25. Article 5 defines "presentation" as "delivery of a document to an issuer or nomi-
nated person for honor or giving of value under a letter of credit." U.C.C. § 5-102(12); see
also ISP98, supra note 10, R. 1.09(a), 3.02. "Honor," in turn, "means performance of the
issuer's undertaking in the letter of credit to pay or deliver an item of value." U.C.C. § 5-
102(8); see also ISP98, supra note 10, R. 2.01(b).
26. See supra note 22.
27. See, e.g., Provident Bank of Md. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 236 F.3d 138, 147
(4th Cir. 2000); In re Slamans, 69 F.3d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 1995); Dibrell Bros. Int'l v. Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1579 (11th Cir. 1994); Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 982 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1992); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank
Leumi, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Strozzo v. Sea Island Bank, 521 S.E.2d
392, 396-97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Vill. of Long Grove v. Austin Bank of Chi., 644 N.E.2d
456, 458-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 4.03[6].
The rule of the independence of the letter of credit from the underlying
transaction is based on two policy considerations. First, the issuing bank can
assume no liability for the performance of the underlying contract because it
has no control over making the underlying contract or over selection of the
beneficiary. Second, the letter of credit would lose its commercial vitality if,
before honoring drafts, the issuing bank were obliged to look beyond the
terms of the letter of credit to the underlying contractual controversy be-
tween its customer and the beneficiary. Whatever the bank pays upon the
letter of credit it can recover from its customer ordinarily. If the customer
feels that the beneficiary was not entitled to that amount, then these parties
can litigate under their contract. In fact, one of the main purposes of the
letter of credit is to place the seller in this stronger position of having the
funds while the parties litigate their underlying contract disputes.
Where the issuer of the letter of credit dishonors a proper demand for
payment.... and therefore further presentation of documents is excused, it is
consistent with the independence principle to regard ... as beyond the pur-
view of the bank's inquiry rights ... any proof that the beneficiary suffered a
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applicant's performance of its contract with the issuer.28
The issuer's agreement to pay the beneficiary out of the issuer's own
funds-with or without the intervention of a confirming, negotiating, or
paying bank 29-is the key to the letter of credit. Indeed, the letter of
credit's "effectiveness ... as a commercial device depends upon prompt
loss on the underlying agreement. If the documents called for by the letter of
credit had been produced, the bank would have no right to inquire into plain-
tiff's actual costs of production or profit margins. When the issuing bank
breaches the credit promise, there is no reason to enlarge the bank's entitle-
ment to challenge the beneficiary. The way to make the beneficiary whole
and provide it with the full benefit of the credit promise is to require the
issuer to pay damages in the face amount of the credit balance. Any other
interpretation as to damages would defeat the basic purpose of such a letter
of credit of providing a means of assuring payment cheaply by eliminating
the need for, or the power of, the issuer to police the underlying transaction.
This approach preserves the efficacy of the letter of credit in commercial
transactions to provide the seller with a means of obtaining prompt payment.
Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 613 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540-41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (cita-
tions omitted).
28. Thus, for example:
From the point of view of the beneficiaries, AMC and Liberty Mutual, the
way that Bank One settled its accounts with Bergner was of no importance,
either legal or practical. As soon as Bank One issued the irrevocable letters
in favor of each beneficiary (for a fee, as Bergner reminds us), it assumed the
obligation of paying upon a draft supported by documents that conformed to
the terms of the credit. Thus, when AMC presented its draft with con-
forming documents to Bank One on July 19,1991, Bank One was required to
pay AMC the full $31,207,000 that the letter of credit then provided, whether
or not Bergner gave it a red cent. If Bergner did not comply with its own
agreement with Bank One, under which it was required to give the bank the
amount of the draw either before or at the time of the payment to the benefi-
ciary, then Bank One would have had a perfectly good contract action
against Bergner, but it would have had no defense against honoring the ben-
eficiary's demand.
In re P.A. Bergner & Co., 140 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Generale
Bank v. Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("This 'independence principle' is most often expressed to distinguish actual letters of
credit from the underlying contracts between buyers and sellers. It is just as clear that
letters of credit are separate from the contracts between the buyers/applicants and the
issuing banks." (citation omitted)).
29. A letter of credit transaction may involve more parties and more undertakings
than those described thus far. Article 5 also recognizes "advisers," who "at the request of
the issuer ... notify the beneficiary that a letter of credit has been issued," U.C.C. § 5-
102(a)(1); see also UCP500, supra note 1, art. 7; ISP98, supra note 10, R. 2.05(a), "con-
firmers," who undertake "at the request or with the consent of the issuer, to honor a pres-
entation under a letter of credit," U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(4); see also UCP500, supra note 1, art.
9; ISP98, supra note 10, R. 1.09(a), and "nominated persons," who "the issuer
(i) designates or authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value under the
letter of credit and (ii) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse,"
U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(11); see also UCP500, supra note 1, art. 10(b)(i); ISP98, supra note 10, R.
2.04(a). A "nominated person" generally serves as either a "negotiating bank" or a "pay-
ing bank":
A negotiating bank, often appointed simply to expedite payment, is au-
thorized, at its option, to act as a confirming bank and is entitled to reim-
bursement plus a fee from the issuer when it does so ....
A paying bank is a bank used as a conduit to get the issuing bank's funds
into the hands of the beneficiary. A paying bank may be designated by an
issuer who wishes to honor the letter of credit but lacks the type or amount
of currency that honoring the letter of credit requires .... The paying bank
2003] 2239
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and inevitable honor of the beneficiary's conforming presentation. '30 So,
what happens when an issuer derails the inevitability of prompt honor by
clearly and unconditionally manifesting its intent not to honor, or its in-
ability to honor, a conforming presentation or draft when and as
promised?
I. THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Part II of this article will explore how the doctrine of anticipatory repu-
diation applies to letters of credit. First, however, it may be helpful to
review key aspects of the law of letters of credit and of the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation.31
A. GOVERNING LAW
Subject to an enforceable agreement to the contrary, 32 Article 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code governs letters of credit issued in the United
States, 33 as well as, in many cases, letters of credit issued outside the
United States in favor of a beneficiary who resides in the United States34
disburses the funds to the beneficiary, then diminishes the issuing bank's ac-
count held with the paying bank accordingly.
George P. Graham, Note, International Commercial Letters of Credit and Choice of Law:
So Whose Law Should Apply Anyway?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 201, 209-10 (2001) (footnotes
omitted); see also U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(11) & cmt. 7; UCP500, supra note 1, arts. 9-10; ISP98,
supra note 10, R. 2.04(a). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 91 2.08[3]. Because this
article is primarily about anticipatory repudiation of letters of credit, and not about the
mechanics of their creation or honor, the remainder of the discussion makes the simplify-
ing assumption that, unless the facts clearly indicate otherwise, any letter of credit transac-
tion at issue involves only an applicant, an issuer, and a beneficiary.
30. 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 9 9.02[1].
31. For more thorough discussions of letter of credit law, see, for example, 1 & 2 Do-
LAN, supra note 11, and BROOKE WUNNICKE ET AL., STANDBY AND COMMERCIAL LET-
TERS OF CREDIT (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2002). For a more thorough discussion of the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation not restricted to the context of letters of credit, see
Keith A. Rowley, A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law,
69 U. CIN. L. REV. 565 (2001), and the sources cited therein.
32. See U.C.C. § 5-116(a) (1995) ("The liability of an issuer.., is governed by the law
of the jurisdiction chosen by an agreement... authenticated by the affected parties ... or
by a provision in the[ir] letter of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking. The jurisdic-
tion whose law is chosen need not bear any relation to the transaction."); see also UCP500,
supra note 1, art. 1; ISP98, supra note 10, R. 1.01(b).
33. U.C.C. § 5-116(b) ("Unless [section 5-116(a)] applies, the liability of an issuer...
is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the [issuer] is located .... ); see, e.g.,
Bank of Joliet v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., No. 96 C 1145, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15384, at *17-18 (N.D. I11. Sept. 30, 1997) (applying Wisconsin law, to the extent it did not
conflict with the UCP500, supra note 1, to ascertain the liability of the Wisconsin-domiciled
bank where the parties failed to agree to apply the law of any other jurisdiction to those
issues not resolved by the UCP500). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, $ 4.02; Franck
Chantayan, Choice of Law Under Revised Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code-§ 5-
116, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COMM. 199 (1999); Graham, supra note 29, at 213.
34. For letters of credit issued outside of the United States in favor of American bene-
ficiaries that are not subject to the Convention, United Nations Convention on Indepen-
dent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit, Dec. 11, 1995, 1995 U.N.Y.B. 1358, at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/payments/guarantees.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003)
[hereinafter U.N. Convention], and in which the parties have not explicitly chosen their
governing law, American courts have tended to apply the law of the issuer's residence in
2240 [Vol. 56
LETTERS OF CREDIT
and letters of credit issued outside the United States in which the parties
expressly choose to have their agreement governed by Article 5.35 The
version of Article 5 currently in effect in every state except Wisconsin 36
cases in which the court has concluded that payment is excused and the law of the benefici-
ary's residence-i.e., Article 5-in cases in which the court has concluded that payment is
not excused. See Graham, supra note 29, at 213-22, and cases cited therein.
35. See U.C.C. § 5-116(a).
The U.N. Convention takes a similar approach to the law governing international
standby letters of credit. Subject to an enforceable agreement to the contrary, see U.N.
Convention, supra note 34, arts. 1(1), 1(3), 21(a), the Convention governs a letter of credit
if the applicant's, beneficiary's, issuer's, and confirming bank's (if any) most "relevant"
places of business or residences are in at least two different countries, see id. art. 4, and
either the issuer is located in a country that is a party to the Convention, see id. art. 1(a), or
"the rules of private international law" lead to applying the law of a country that is a party
to the Convention, see id. art. 1(b). The Convention also governs a letter of credit if the
parties, notwithstanding their residence, have expressly chosen the Convention to govern
the undertaking. See id. arts. 1(2), 21. See generally Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Essence of a
Letter of Credit Under Revised U.C.C. Article 5: Permissible and Impermissible Nondocu-
mentary Conditions Affecting Honor, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1079, 1089-90 (1998). As of No-
vember 3, 2003, only Belarus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kuwait, Panama, and Tunisia had
ratified the Convention. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), Status of Conventions and Model Laws: United Nations Convention on In-
dependent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit, available at http://www.uncitral.org/
english/status/status-e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). The United States has signed the
Convention, but has not yet ratified it. See id. For an overview of the Convention, see
Filip De Ly, The UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of
Credit, 33 INT'L LAW. 831 (1999).
36. ALA. CODE § 7-5-101 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.101 (Michie 2001); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-5101 (West 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-5-101 (Michie 2001); CAL.
COM. CODE § 5101 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-5-101 (West 2001); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-5-101 (West Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 5-101 (1999);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:5-101 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 675.101 (West Supp. 2002); GA.
CODE ANN. § 11-5-101 (Harrison Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:5-101 (Michie 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 28-5-101 (Michie 2001); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 810, T 5/5-101 (West 2002);
IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-5.1-101 (Michie Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.5101 (West
2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-5-101 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.5-101 (Michie
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-101 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 5-1101
(West Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW II § 5-101 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 5-101 (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.5101 (West Supp. 2002);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.5-101 (West 2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-5-101 (1999); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 400.5-101 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-5-101 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 5-
101 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 104.5101 (Michie 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-
A:5-101 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:5-101 (West Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-5-
101 (Michie Supp. 2001); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-101 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-5-
101 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-05-01 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1305.01 (West
Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 5-101 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 75.1010
(1999); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5101 (West Supp. 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-5-101
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101 (Law. Co-op Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-
5-101 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-5-101 (2001); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.101 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-5-101 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 5-
101 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.5A-101 (Michie 2001); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.5-
101 (West Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE § 46-5-101 (2001); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-5-101
(Michie 2001).
Wisconsin's Article 5 is still based on the 1962 version of uniform Article 5. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 405.101-405.118 (West 1995); U.C.C. §§ 5-101 to -117 (1962). Despite a
unanimous recommendation from the appropriate committee, Wisconsin Senate Bill 203
("An Act to... adopt[ ] revised Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code .. ") did not
pass during the 2001-02 legislative session. See http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2001/data/
SB203hst.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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explicitly recognizes the ability of letter of credit parties to expressly in-
corporate the current Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits ("UCP"), 37 promulgated by the International Chamber of Com-
merce.38 If the parties expressly incorporate the UCP into their letter of
credit (which most do 39-often as boilerplate, rather than as a negotiated
37. UCP500, supra note 1. UCP500 replaced the 1983 revisions to the UCP. INTER-
NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 400, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE
FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1983) [hereinafter UCP400]. UCP400 replaced the 1974
revision. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 290, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1974) [hereinafter UCP290]. The ICC is-
sued prior versions in 1962, 1951, and 1933. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
PUB. No. 222, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1962);
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 151, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRAC-
TICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1951); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
PUB. No. 74, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1933).
For an overview of the UCP500 and a discussion of their interaction with former Article
5 and Revised Article 5, see 6B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES [Rev.] § 5-103:3 (1999 & Supp. 2002); 6B WILLIAM D.
HAWKLAND & TOM L. HOLLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 5-102:7 (1999 &
Supp. 2002); and Katherine A. Barski, Letters of Credit: A Comparison of Article 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its, 41 Loy. L. REV. 735 (1996). See generally Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its (UCP), 56 A.L.R.5th 565 (1998).
38. See U.C.C. § 5-116(c) (1995); see, e.g., Mantua Mfg. Co. v. Commerce Exch. Bank,
661 N.E.2d 161,165 (Ohio 1996) ("[W]hen a letter of credit is subject to the UCP and there
is a direct conflict between a provision of the UCP and an analogous provision of [Article
5], the UCP terms replace those of [Article 5], unless that replacement violates the condi-
tions of [current section 1-102(3)]."); Vest v. Pilot Point Nat'l Bank, 996 S.W.2d 9, 15 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) ("The UCP ... can have the force of law when
incorporated into a letter of credit."); see also Voest-Alpine Trading Co. v. Bank of China,
167 F. Supp. 2d 940, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ("Where parties explicitly refer to the UCPS00 in
their contracts, the UCP has been interpreted to apply to the transaction."), affd, 288 F.3d
262 (5th Cir. 2002). See generally Chantayan, supra note 33, at 207-08.
While the version of Article 5 still in effect in Wisconsin does not explicitly address the
UCP, it does recognize that Article 5 is not the exclusive source of rules governing letters
of credit, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 405.102(3), and that the parties may vary most provisions
of Article 5 by agreement, see id. § 401.102(3). Decisions applying Wisconsin's version of
Article 5 suggest that courts consider the UCP to be a valid modification if incorporated
into the letter of credit by reference. See, e.g., In re P.A. Bergner & Co., 140 F.3d 1111,
1114-15 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Wisconsin law and holding that a irrevocable standby
letter of credit that, inter alia, specified it was subject to UCP400 was "governed by"
UCP400); Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank of Hilldale, 665 F. Supp. 722, 725-27 (W.D. Wis.
1987) (applying article 16 of the UCP400 to determine whether the issuer had timely noti-
fied the beneficiary that it was dishonoring the beneficiary's draft); see also, e.g., Beathard
v. Chic. Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that, where
the language of letters of credit at issue did not reveal whether they were revocable or
irrevocable, Article 1 of the 1962 version of the UCP-which was incorporated by refer-
ence into the letter of credit, provided that the letters must be deemed to be revocable).
Because the UCP do not contain a choice of law provision-other than Article 1, which
states only that the UCP will apply if the parties expressly incorporate them into their
letter of credit, see UCPS00, supra note 1, art. 1-parties cannot "opt out" of Article 5 by
"opting in" to the UCP. See U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 2 ("Since incorporation of the UCP
avoids only 'conflicting' Article 5 rules, parties who do not wish to be governed by the
nonconflicting provisions of Article 5 must normally either adopt the law of a jurisdiction
other than a State of the United States or state explicitly the rule that is to govern."). See
generally Graham, supra note 29, at 213.
39. See Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indon., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 618, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[TJhe UCP commonly governs letters of credit by virtue of its incorpora-
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term), then the UCP will govern the letter of credit to the extent the UCP
and Article 5 conflict, except with respect to those Article 5 protections
the parties may not agree to vary.40 Even if the parties do not explicitly
incorporate the UCP, courts will look to the UCP for evidence of custom
and usage.41 And, where the issue presented is not resolved by applying
tion into most letters of credit."); UBAF Arab Am. Bank v. New World Research Corp.,
571 N.Y.S.2d 223, 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (acknowledging that "nearly all international
letters of credit" incorporate the UCP); Prefatory Note to U.C.C. Revised Article 5 (1995)
(recognizing that the UCP are "used in most international letters of credit and in many
domestic letters of credit" and that the UCP are "usually incorporated into letters of credit,
particularly international letters of credit"); U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 2 ("Many letters of credit
specifically adopt the UCP as applicable to the particular transaction.").
40. The U.C.C. explains that:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the liability of an issuer...
is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such as the [UCP], to which
the letter of credit ... or other undertaking is expressly made subject. If (i)
this chapter would govern the liability of an issuer.., under [section 5-116(a)
or (b)], (ii) the relevant undertaking incorporates [the UCP], and (iii) there is
conflict between [Article 5] and th[e UCP] as applied to that undertaking,...
except to the extent of any conflict with [U.C.C. §§ 5-102(a)(9)-(10), 5-
103(a), (c), (d), 5-106(d), 5-114(d), 5-117(d)].
U.C.C. § 5-116(c); see, e.g., Mantua Mfg., 661 N.E.2d at 165 (applying article 10(d) of
UCP400, requiring only the consent of the issuing bank, confirming bank (if any), and
beneficiary prior to amending or canceling an irrevocable letter of credit, rather than for-
mer U.C.C. § 5-106(2), which required the applicant's consent, as well); Vest, 996 S.W.2d at
14-15 (applying the "reasonable care" standard of UCP500 art. 13, instead of the "strict
compliance" standard developed by the Texas courts under former U.C.C. § 5-109(2), to
determine whether the issuer wrongfully honored a demand that contained a documentary
discrepancy). See generally Dole, supra note 35, at 1088. Courts should not assume a con-
flict between Revised Article 5 and the UCP in the absence of an express one. See U.C.C.
§ 5-103 cmt. 2. For a discussion of Revised Article 5's nonvariable provisions, see Sandra
Stern, Varying Article 5 of the UCC by Agreement, 114 BANKING L.J. 516, 517-21 (1997).
41. See, e.g., Mantua Mfg., 661 N.E.2d at 166 (stating that, even if the UCP were not
expressly incorporated by the parties, the UCP are "a guide to trade usage in letter of
credit transactions").
Because the International Chamber of Commerce drafted the UCP500 primarily with
commercial letters of credit in mind, and because some have perceived the UCP not to
apply well to standby letters of credit, see, e.g., James E. Byrne, Why the ISP Should be
Used for Standbys, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD, Jan. 2000, at 23, the Institute of Inter-
national Banking Law and Practice, Inc. drafted, and the International Chamber of Com-
merce has endorsed, the 1998 International Standby Practices ("ISP98"). ISP98, supra
note 10. For an authoritative analysis of ISP98, see JAMES E. BYRNE, THE OFFICIAL COM-
MENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES (James G. Barnes ed. 1998). For
a thoughtful critique of ISP98, see John F. Dolan, Analyzing Bank Drafted Standby Letter
of Credit Rules: The International Standby Practice (ISP98), 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1865
(2000).
The 1995 version of Article 5, which predates the ISP98 by three years, obviously makes
no reference to them. Nor, less obviously, do the text or commentary accompanying any
state's enactment of Revised Article 5 since the ICC promulgated the ISP98. Indeed, the
only statutory reference to ISP98 as of the time of this writing appears in a Maine statute
permitting an employer to post an irrevocable standby letter of credit as proof of solvency
and ability to pay workers' compensation claims. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A,
§ 403(3)(A) (West 2001) ("To the extent not inconsistent with state law, the letter of credit
is subject to and governed by the International Standby Practices 1998 or successor prac-
tices governing standby letters of credit duly adopted by the International Chamber of
Commerce."). The ISP98 have been mentioned in only one case reported as of the time of
this writing. See Nissho Iwai Eur. PLC v. Korea First Bank, 782 N.E.2d 55, 61 (N.Y. 2002)
(citing ISP98 R. 1.10[c][ii] for the proposition that the meaning of "revolving" in the letter
of credit in question "should be derived from the context in which the term is used").
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Article 5 and the UCP (if the latter are incorporated by agreement of the
parties), or by reference to the UCP (if they are not incorporated by
agreement of the parties), courts will turn to common law.42
B. COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT
Letters of credit come in two basic varieties: commercial and standby.
In a typical commercial letter of credit transaction, a buyer (the appli-
cant) induces its bank (the issuer) to irrevocably obligate itself to pay a
seller (the beneficiary) a stated amount of money, at a stated time, on
receipt of stated documents-typically, the seller's invoice and shipping
documents. 43 If the beneficiary presents conforming documents at or by
the stated time, the issuer must honor the letter of credit or answer to the
beneficiary for the issuer's wrongful dishonor.4 4 The issuer's obligation
to the beneficiary is not conditioned on the beneficiary's performance of
its underlying contract with the applicant.45 Nor is it conditioned on the
applicant's performance of its contract with the beneficiary.4 6
Nonetheless, subject to Article 5's prohibitions on contractually varying certain terms, see
supra note 40, parties should be able to incorporate the ISP98 into their standby letters of
credit, see U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (permitting the parties to vary most provisions of Article 5 "by
agreement or by a provision stated or incorporated by reference in an undertaking"), and
have begun doing so at least in certain circles, see James E. Byrne, Overview of Letter of
Credit Law & Practice in 2001, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 7-8 (James E.
Byrne & Christopher S. Brynes eds., 2002) (reporting anectodal evidence of widespread
use of ISP98). And, where the parties have not explicitly incorporated ISP98 into their
standbys, courts should recognize ISP98 as evidence of custom and usage in international
standbys.
42. See, e.g., Hyosung Am., Inc. v. Sumagh Textile Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 376, 385 & n.l
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing an applicant's common law right to assert a fraud claim
against the beneficiary after the letter of credit had been drawn down and the applicant's
account had been debited, because such an exception did not conflict with the UCP, which
the parties had chosen as governing law under former N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4)), affd, 189
F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999); Leonard A. Feinberg, Inc. v. Cent. Asia Capital Corp., 974 F.
Supp. 822, 835-38 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (applying common law to ascertain the proper classifica-
tion for a party to the letter of credit transaction that did not fit within any of the party
types denominated in former Article 5 or the UCP and the effect of a so-called "red
clause"); First State Bank v. Diamond Plastics Corp., 891 P.2d 1262, 1271-72 (Okla. 1995)
(holding that a letter of credit beneficiary could assert equitable estoppel to bar the issuer
from refusing to honor drafts which were consistent with draf.s the issuer had previously
honored against letters of credit containing similar language and requirements as the ones
at issue); see also infra note 87.
43. See, e.g., Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("Alaska Textile Co.... is a New York-based textile company that exports fabric
from India. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., a manufacturer of women's clothing, contracted
with Alaska in early 1988 to buy several thousand yards of Indian silk ... to be delivered to
Lloyd's facility in Hong Kong. To make payment, Lloyd arranged for... Chase Manhattan
Bank to issue two letters of credit in favor of Alaska, for $82,500 and $47,141.25, respec-
tively."); see also supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text. See generally Henry D.
Gabriel, Standby Letters of Credit: Does the Risk Outweigh the Benefits?, 1988 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 705, 708-09.
44. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a); supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text. See generally 1
DOLAN, supra note 11, T 6.01; WUNNICKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2.02.
45. See supra note 27.
46. See State ex rel. Hwy. & Transp. Comm'n v. Morganstein, 703 S.W.2d 894, 898
(Mo. 1986) ("No default in performance of the underlying obligation by the [applicant] is
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The issuer's obligation to the beneficiary of a standby letter of credit,
by contrast, is conditioned on the applicant's performance of-or, more
precisely, the beneficiary's presentation of documents evidencing the ap-
plicant's failure to perform-its underlying contract with the benefici-
ary.4 7 Thus,
[w]hile the applicant is performing, or preparing to perform, its obli-
gation on the contract, the beneficiary, who awaits that performance,
has the benefit of a separate promise (from the issuer) that if the
applicant defaults, the issuer will pay the beneficiary an amount of
money secured by the letter of credit.48
In a typical standby letter of credit transaction, the applicant induces
the issuer to irrevocably obligate itself to pay the beneficiary up to a
stated amount of money, at or before a stated time, on receipt of docu-
mentation-sometimes simply a self-serving statement by the benefici-
ary49 -evidencing the applicant's default on the underlying obligation.50
If (but only if) the beneficiary can satisfy the issuer that the applicant has
failed to pay as promised, the issuer must pay the beneficiary out of the
issuer's own funds.51
necessary to trigger the obligation of the issuer to pay under the letter."). See generally
WUNNICKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2,06.
47. See Gabriel, supra note 43, at 709 ("In contrast to [commercial] letters of credit,
the rights of a standby letter of credit beneficiary are activated only after the [applicant]
has defaulted on the underlying contract.").
48. S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank of Ala., 709 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Ala.
1998).
For example:
The effect of standby letters of credit like these is to put the issuer (Bank
One) itself behind the [applicant]'s (Bergner's) promises to pay. As long as
Bergner paid those with which it contracted, the standby letters of credit did
not come into play. If, however, one of the events entitling a beneficiary to
draw on a letter of credit occurred, then the beneficiary was entitled to go
straight to Bank One to collect its money, without worrying about Bergner's
financial health. Bank One, in turn, promised to honor a demand from ei-
ther beneficiary that conformed to the letters of credit, no matter what de-
fenses Bergner may have had against either AMC's or Liberty Mutual's
request for funds.
In re P.A. Bergner & Co., 140 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1998).
49. See 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 1.07[2]; WUNNICKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 13.10.
50. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Little, 978 S.W.2d 272, 277 n.8 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1998, pet denied) (observing that the standby letter of credit issued by NCNB at the
request of Justin, a boot manufacturer, in favor of Mitco, a supplier of ostrich skins "did
not actually represent payment for the skins. It merely represented that Mitco ... would
be paid by NCNB if Justin otherwise defaulted on the contract after the skins were sent.").
See generally WUNNICKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2.04.
As is true with commercial letters of credit, see supra note 22, standby letters of credit
can be "clean"-meaning that the beneficiary can demand payment without any accompa-
nying documentation. See 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 1.07[2], and cases cited therein.
51. See, e.g., P.A. Bergner, 140 F.3d at 1116 ("[O]n July 19, 1991, AMC submitted




C. REVOCABLE AND IRREVOCABLE LETTERS OF CREDIT
Letters of credit may be either revocable or irrevocable. 52 While the
issuer of a revocable letter of credit may unilaterally amend or cancel the
credit at any time prior to the beneficiary's presentation, 53 once an issuer
has established an irrevocable letter of credit, the issuer may not amend
or cancel the credit without the beneficiary's consent.54
Former Article 5 created no presumption one way or another as to a
letter of credit's revocability. 55 Thus, under former Article 5, "when a
letter of credit ... fail[ed] to specifically state whether it [wa]s revocable
or irrevocable, . . . the question of revocability" was left to the court. 56
That said, courts deciding the issue of revocability under former Article 5
seemed generally inclined to find a letter of credit that was facially silent
52. See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, T 1.10.
53. See U.C.C. § 5-106(b) (1995) (providing that a party's rights and responsibilities
under an issued letter of credit cannot be amended or cancelled without her consent "ex-
cept to the extent the letter of credit provides that it is revocable"); see, e.g., Beathard v.
Chi. Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (N.D. I11. 1976) (applying the pre-UCP500
presumption of revocability, see infra note 60, to two letters of credit that did not state on
their face whether they were revocable or irrevocable, and holding that the issuer was
entitled to revoke them prior to presentation). See generally Leon, supra note 219, at 445-
46.
54. See U.C.C. § 5-106(b) ("After a letter of credit is issued, rights and obligations of a
beneficiary, applicant, confirmer, and issuer are not affected by an amendment or cancella-
tion to which that person has not consented except to the extent the letter of credit pro-
vides ... that the issuer may amend or cancel the letter of credit without that consent.");
see, e.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., 767 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the issuer's revocation of a six-month letter of credit without the beneficiary's
consent after only three months was wrongful, where the letter provided that it would
"remain in force for a period of six (6) months from August 5, 1981, and w[ould] be availa-
ble to [the beneficiary] on its sight draft for 100% invoice cost to be accompanied by a
letter of demand from [the beneficiary] and supported by commercial invoices"); Braun v.
Intercontinental Bank, 466 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("The irrevocable
letter of credit was issued by Intercontinental for the benefit of Griferia. Although Inter-
continental was on notice that Braun [the applicant] wished to cancel the letter of credit,
this wish could not be carried out without the consent of Griferia."). See generally Leon,
supra note 219, at 446.
55. See U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 1 (1962) ("[T]he engagement may be either revocable or
irrevocable .... Neither the definition [of "letter of credit" in former section 5-103(1)(a)]
nor any other section of this Article deals with the issue of when a credit, not clearly
labelled as either revocable or irrevocable within the one or the other category."). See
generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, T 1.10 & n.305 (also noting that two states-Florida and
Louisiana-adopted non-uniform former Article 5 provisions creating a presumption of
irrevocability).
See U.C.C. § 5-115 cmt. 3 (advising that, because "revocable credits may be modified or
revoked without notice to the customer or the beneficiary, rights against the issuer like
those here provided can hardly arise under them"). See generally 6B HAWKLAND & HOL-
LAND, supra note 37, § 5-115:1.
56. 6B HAWKLAND & HOLLAND, supra note 37, § 5:103-2; see, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Fairfield, 502 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D. Conn. 1980) ("If the letter of
credit is silent, the answer to whether it is irrevocable depends on case law."); W. Va. Hous.
Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1111-13 (W.D. Pa. 1976) ("[T]he court receives only
minimal guidance from Article Five of the Uniform Commercial Code in determining




on the issue to be irrevocable. 57 Although former Article 5 made no pre-
sumption as to revocability, it did condition the application of its anticipa-
tory repudiation provision on the subject letter of credit being
irrevocable. 58 Revised Article 5 explicitly states, "[a] letter of credit is
revocable only if it so provides. '59 The current UCP60 and the ISP9861
both presume irrevocability.
D. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION: A BRIEF REVIEW
Suppose that on May 1, A agrees to purchase an automobile from B,
and B agrees to sell it to A for $15,000. A and B further agree that A will
pay B the full $15,000 purchase price on July 1, at which time B will trans-
fer title to the automobile to A. While A is not obligated to perform until
July 1, his May 1 promise creates immediate duties: A is required both to
perform as promised on July 1 and to refrain from repudiating his prom-
ise to B at any time prior to July 1. If, at any time prior to July 1, A
definitely and unconditionally manifests to B his inability to, or his intent
not to, perform as and when promised, then A's repudiation constitutes
an anticipatory breach of the contract-despite the fact that B has no
right to expect A to perform until July 1.62
57. See, e.g., Diskmakers, Inc., v. DeWitt Equip. Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1178 (3d Cir.
1977) ("[W]hen the contract spoke of a 'letter of credit' without designating it as revocable,
the language must be construed as requiring an irrevocable instrument."); Data Gen.
Corp., 502 F. Supp. at 783 ("A revocable letter of credit provides the beneficiary seller with
little protection. Therefore, unless otherwise provided in the letter of credit itself, there
should be a presumption in favor of irrevocability."). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note
11, 1 4.06[2][a].
58. See U.C.C. § 5-115 cmt. 3 (advising that, because "revocable credits may be modi-
fied or revoked without notice to the customer or the beneficiary, rights against the issuer
like those here provided can hardly arise under them"). See generally 6B HAWKLAND &
HOLLAND, supra note 37, § 5-115:1.
59. See U.C.C. § 5-106(a) (1995). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 4.06[2][a].
60. See UCP500, supra note 1, art. 6(c) (providing that, in the absence of a clear indi-
cation whether the letter of credit is revocable or irrevocable, the letter of credit "shall be
deemed to be irrevocable"). Prior to 1993, the UCP explicitly presumed revocability. See
UCP400, supra note 37, art. 7(c) (providing that, in the absence of a clear indication
whether the letter of credit is revocable or irrevocable, the letter of credit "shall be deemed
to be revocable"); see, e.g., Conoco v. Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., 767 F.2d 470, 470
(8th Cir. 1985) ("[A]bsent clear indication of irrevocability, such credits are deemed revo-
cable."). See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 511, Docu-
MENTARY CREDITS: UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED 14 (Charles del Busto ed. 1993); 1 DOLAN,
supra note 11, 4.06[2]; Ross P. Buckley, The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 265, 295 (1993).
61. See ISP98, supra note 10, R. 1.06(a) ("A standby is an irrevocable, independent,
documentary, and binding undertaking when issued and need not so state."). Official
Comment 3 to Rule 1.06 further states that ISP98 makes "no provision" for revocable
standby letters of credit and "offers no insight into the particular questions relevant to a
revocable undertaking." BYRNE, supra note 41, at 25; see also ISP98, supra note 10, R. 7.01
("A beneficiary's rights under a standby may not be cancelled without its consent.").
The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of
Credit, likewise, presumes irrevocability. See U.N. Convention, supra note 34, art. 7(4)
("An undertaking is irrevocable upon issuance, unless it stipulates that it is revocable.").
62. See Rowley, supra note 31, at 566, and the cases cited therein.
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A promisor may repudiate either by word or by action.63 If a promisor
tells his promisee that he either cannot, or will not, perform the contract
as and when promised, the promisor's statement will generally operate as
an anticipatory breach. 64 Likewise, a promisor may anticipatorily breach
if he commits some voluntary act that makes it impossible for him to
perform the contract when and as promised.65 Absent a contractual or
legal duty to speak or act,66 a promisor generally cannot anticipatorily
repudiate by mere silence or inaction.67
A promisee whose promisor has repudiated his obligation may: (1) do
nothing, subject to the promisee's obligation to mitigate damages,68 and
63. See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 1 (1989) ("[A]nticipatory repudiation centers upon an
overt communication of intention or an action which renders performance impossible or
demonstrates a clear determination not to continue with performance.").
64. See id. § 2-610 & cmt. 1; see, e.g., Cary Oil Co. v. MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 90 F.
Supp. 2d 401, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the defendants anticipatorily repudiated
their flexible delivery petroleum agreements with the plaintiffs when they wrote the plain-
tiffs purporting to "confirm" a non-existent "agreement" to cancel the contracts and "re-
lieve both parties of any obligation thereunder"); P.R.S. Int'l, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 703
N.E.2d 71, 80 (III. 1998) ("PRS ... indicated to Shred Pax that it would refuse to accept
delivery of the pyrolysis system. In addition, PRS officers stated to Shred Pax that...
PRS's owners were attempting to become 'completely disassociated with anything to do
with tire shredding and/or burning.' Thus, PRS repudiated the contract with Shred Pax.");
Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co. v. Frosh, 494 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the defendant anticipatorily repudiated his contract to sell beans to the plaintiff when
he walked into the plaintiff's offices and directed plaintiff's agent "to tear up the contract
because [defendant] wanted no contract"); Tenavision, Inc. v. Neuman, 379 N.E.2d 1166,
1168 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that a purchaser of TV sets anticipatorily repudiated by commu-
nicating to its seller "that the sets were no longer needed and that delivery would not be
accepted"); Am. Bronze Corp. v. Streamway Prods., 456 N.E.2d 1295, 1301 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982) ("American's Vice-President . . . stated unequivocally on January 24, 1980 that
American would not perform any further on the three contracts and in fact had melted
down those units already produced. . . . Therefore, American anticipatorily repudiated
these contracts and became liable to Streamway.").
65. See, e.g., In re Okla. Trash Control, Inc., 258 B.R. 461, 465 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
2001) (holding that the defendant anticipatorily repudiated when, after notifying the plain-
tiff that it had ceased operations and would no longer perform the terms of the contract, its
sole employees moved out of the state); Champion v. Whaley, 311 S.E.2d 404, 407 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that the defendants repudiated their contract to sell certain land to the
plaintiffs because the defendants sold it to someone else).
66. See, e.g., Dade County v. Palmer & Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 318 F.2d 18, 22 (5th Cir.
1963) (holding that county commission's failure to timely adopt certain resolutions that
were essential to planning and funding a construction project was an anticipatory repudia-
tion); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Brown, 256 So. 2d 894, 898 (Ala. Ct. App. 1971) (holding
that seller anticipatorily repudiated land conveyance contract by permitting adjoining land-
owner to build a fence that encroached on the seller's land without objecting to the en-
croachment or notifying the purchaser of the encroachment prior to passage of title).
67. See, e.g., Sauer v. Xerox Corp., 938 F. Supp. 155, 165 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that a lessor could not infer from its lessee's failure to pay rent for a renewal period that
the lessee would, likewise, fail to pay rent for a second renewal period and fail to pay the
fair market value to purchase the leased goods at the end of the renewal term).
One notable instance in which silence or inaction will constitute a repudiation is if the
silence or inaction is in response to a proper demand for adequate assurances of perform-
ance. See infra note 70.
68. See, e.g., In re St. Mary Hosp., 101 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) ("[T]he
repudiatee has the burden of mitigating its damages by taking reasonable measures to min-
imize its losses."); Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293,
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await the promisor's performance at the appointed time;69 (2) seek assur-
ances from the promisor that, his apparent repudiation notwithstanding,
he will perform as and when promised;70 (3) cancel the contract;71 or (4)
bring suit against the promisor or otherwise act in reliance on the repudi-
ation.72 The promisee seeking assurances need only be reasonably uncer-
tain that the promisor can perform, not absolutely certain that the
promisor cannot perform.73 Nor, for that matter, does the promisee have
300 (Tex. 1997) ("A suit for anticipatory repudiation ... give[s] rise to the landlord's duty
to mitigate damages upon the tenant's breach and abandonment.").
Article 5 imposes no such duty to mitigate on nonrepudiating beneficiaries. See infra
notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
69. See U.C.C. § 2-610(a) ("When either party repudiates the contract with respect to
a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the con-
tract to the other, the aggrieved party may: (a) For a commercially reasonable time await
performance by the repudiating party .... ); see, e.g., Fredonia Broad. Corp. v. RCA
Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[Tjhe aggrieved party can refuse to accede to
an anticipatory repudiation and can choose not to sue for the anticipatory repudiation.
When the aggrieved party follows this course, the contract remains in existence."). But see,
e.g., Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl 0. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064, 1071-73
(5th Cir. 1984); Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford, 553 F.2d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 1977) (both sug-
gesting that a buyer's ability to ignore a repudiation and await performance may be tem-
pered by the buyer's duty to attempt cover within a reasonable time of learning of the
repudiation, where the market price for the subject of the contract continues to rise from
the date of repudiation through the date performance was due).
70. See U.C.C. § 2-609(1) ("When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect
to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of
due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable sus-
pend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return."); see, e.g.,
Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 568-69 (10th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff gas producer was entitled to seek adequate assurances from the defen-
dant gas purchaser that it would perform under the take-or-pay contract between the
parties after the defendant insisted that the plaintiff agree to an unfavorable amendment to
the agreement as a precondition to the defendant's future performance).
71. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(b), 2-703(f), 2-711(1) (collectively recognizing a seller's and
buyer's respective rights to cancel in response to a wrongful repudiation); see, e.g., Hudson
Feather & Down Prods., Inc. v. Lancer Clothing Corp., 513 N.Y.S.2d 173, 174 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) (holding that a seller's refusal to respond to its buyer's demands for assurances
"was a substantial impairment of the whole contract and the buyer was therefore entitled
to cancel the contract and cease performance" (citation omitted)).
72. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(b), 2-703(c)-(e), 2-711(1)-(2) (collectively recognizing a
seller's and buyer's respective rights to immediately bring suit in response to a wrongful
repudiation); see, e.g., In re Randall's Island Family Golf Ctrs., Inc., 261 B.R. 96, 103
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Gelman's attempt to withdraw his irrevocable offer prior to ac-
ceptance constituted an anticipatory repudiation. The debtors ... could immediately de-
clare a breach and recover damages .... ." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 272 B.R. 521
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co. v. Frosh, 494 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1992) ("Section 2-610(b) provides a remedy for breach of contract before the time of
performance has arrived. If a buyer chooses to treat the repudiation as a breach, . . .
Section 2-711(1) provides that the buyer may cancel and recover any amount paid to the
seller, as well as seek damages for cover or the contract-market differential." (citations
omitted)); Wagal v. SI Diamond Tech., Inc., 998 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that "[w]hen a buyer repudiates a contract, the seller may
resort to any remedy for breach provided by the UCC," including reclaiming the goods and
suing the buyer for any difference between the contract price and the sum of the resale
price and any payments made by the buyer).
73. See, e.g., Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Pan. Canal Co., 730 F.2d 186, 191 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that "[iut was certainly not unreasonable" for the defendant to "become
alarmed" about the plaintiff's ability to perform after the defendant received a phone call
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to be correct about the promisor's apparent inability or unwillingness to
perform, as long as the promisee's suspicion was reasonable.74 Once a
party receives a "justifiable" written demand for adequate assurances, he
must "provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such
assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of
the particular case."'75 A promisor failing to timely provide adequate as-
surances has, as a matter of law, anticipatorily repudiated, entitling the
party who sought assurances to immediately bring suit.76
A promisee who chooses to bring suit, to seek assurances, or to do
nothing and await the promisor's performance, may urge the promisor to
retract his repudiation and perform as and when promised.77 And,
whether the promisee so urges, if the promisee has not cancelled the con-
tract, materially changed her position, brought suit upon the repudiation,
or otherwise indicated that she considers the repudiation to be final, the
promisor may retract or otherwise cure his repudiation,78 foreclosing the
from a third party-who "had played a major role in brokering the deal between" the
plaintiff and defendant "and could reasonably have been considered to have good informa-
tion about [the plaintiff]'s financial status"-informing the defendant that the plaintiff was
not current on financial obligations integral to the business relationship between the plain-
tiff and defendant).
74. See, e.g., Turntables, Inc, v. Gestetner, 382 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976) (holding that the defendant properly invoked section 2-609 "even though his suspi-
cion that plaintiff was insolvent may have been inaccurate," as long as the defendant had
"reasonable grounds for insecurity determined according to commercial standards, and of
course good faith" (quotations and citation omitted)).
75. U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
76. See id.; see, e.g., Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Hanig, 610 N.W.2d 518, 523-24 (Iowa 2000)
(finding that the defendant failed to satisfy section 2-609 when, inter alia, the defendant
"assured" the plaintiff that he would perform only on a condition that could not be satis-
fied within thirty days of the plaintiff's justified demand for adequate assurances). See
generally Rowley, supra note 31, at 619-20.
77. See U.C.C. § 2-610(b) ("When either party repudiates the contract with respect to
a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the con-
tract to the other, the aggrieved party may ... (b) resort to any remedy for breach, even
though he has notified the repudiating party that he would await the latter's performance and
has urged retraction." (emphasis added)); Randall's Island Family Golf Ctrs., 261 B.R. at
101-02 ("[A]n anticipatory breach, like any other breach, gives the non-breaching party
two mutually exclusive options. He may elect to treat the contract as terminated and exer-
cise his remedies, or continue to treat the contract as valid .... He may refuse, for a time,
to acquiesce in the repudiation, and urge the repudiator to perform without waiving any of
his rights." (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc. v.
United States, 530 U.S. 604, 621-22 (2000) ("The Government ... cannot claim that the
companies waived their rights simply by urging performance. Nor has the Government
convinced us that the companies' continued actions under the contracts amount to any-
thing more than this urging of performance." (citations omitted)); Mindel v. Image Point
Prod., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 189, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Th[e] effect of Mindel's repudiation
was not altered by Image Point's attempts to convince Mindel to change his mind ....");
Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("After receiving Jon-T's December 10 letter of repudiation, Good-
pasture refused to honor Jon-T's drafts. Such a suspension of performance is authorized
specifically by [section 2-610(b)] .... Goodpasture also demanded that Jon-T honor the
contract. This, too, is authorized by [section 2-610(b)].").
78. See U.C.C. § 2-611(1) ("Until the repudiating party's next performance is due he
can retract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled
or materially changed his position or otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation
final."). Compare, e.g., Truman L. Flatt & Sons Co. v. Schupf, 649 N.E.2d 990, 996 (I11.
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promisee's ability to prevail on a claim for damages based on the prom-
isor's anticipatory breach. In any event, the promisor's repudiation re-
lieves the promisee from any further tender or performance that would
otherwise be due under the contract. 79
Not all repudiations give rise to an immediate cause of action. Courts
generally refuse to apply the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to uni-
lateral contracts, including unilateral contracts to pay money. 80 Likewise,
courts generally hold that, once one party to a bilateral contract has fully
performed, any repudiation by the party who has yet to perform will gen-
erally not support a claim of anticipatory breach. 81 On the other hand, if
App. Ct. 1995) ("[Dlefendants admitted.., they had not entered another agreement to sell
the property, nor even discussed or considered the matter with another party. Defendants
had not changed their position at all, nor do defendants make any attempt to so argue."),
with, e.g., Neptune Research & Dev., Inc. v. Teknics Indus. Sys., Inc., 563 A.2d 465, 472
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that the repudiator's attempted retraction was
foreclosed by the nonrepudiating party's prior cancellation of the contract), and Lake Erie
Distribs., Inc. v. Martlet Importing Co., 634 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (hold-
ing that a franchisor's attempt to retract its repudiation of its franchise agreement was
ineffective, because the franchisee had already filed suit before the franchisor retracted).
A repudiating party may retract "by any method which clearly indicates to the aggrieved
party that the repudiating party intends to perform." U.C.C. § 2-611(2). Compare, e.g., Al
Ferro Commodities Corp., S.A. v. Tube City Iron & Metal Co., 728 F. Supp. 1158, 1164
(E.D. Pa.) ("Tube City proposed to Al Ferro to take delivery of the scrap shortly after
expiration of the December 4, 1987 deadline. In a telex dated December 8, 1987, Tube
City stated that it could have a ship ready during the December 10-20, 1987 period. Al
Ferro... sent a telex to Tube City on December 8, 1987, agreeing to extend the shipment
delivery date to December 10-20, 1987. The Court finds that, by telex dated December 8,
1987, Tube City retracted its repudiation of the Agreement by clearly indicating to Al
Ferro its intent to perform under the Agreement."), aftd, 914 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1990), with,
e.g., Randall's Island Family Golf Ctrs., 261 B.R. at 102 ("[Frank] conceded that he never
told Rich that Gelman would perform, saying that Gelman was awaiting confirmation that
he was the Successful Bidder 'because it would only be at that time that Gelman would
have to do anything.' . . . [Tihese equivocal statements did not convey Gelman's uncondi-
tional intention to honor his bid, and were not sufficient to retract his earlier
repudiation.").
79. See U.C.C. § 2-610(c); see, e.g., P.R.S. Int'l, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 703 N.E.2d 71,
80 (Il. 1998) ("PRS repudiated the contract with Shred Pax.... PRS's claim that Shred
Pax breached the contract by failing to deliver the pyrolysis machine must fail; the duty to
deliver was excused by PRS's own repudiation of the contract ...."); Great W. Sugar Co.
v. World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 523 N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (II. App. Ct. 1988) ("World's
Finest repudiated the contract by refusing to accept the sugar which it contracted to
purchase. Therefore, even if Great Western had not made a formal tender of the sugar a
formal tender was excused by World's Finest's repudiation and did not constitute a condi-
tion precedent to World's Finest's duty to accept the sugar."); Hudson Feather & Down
Prods., Inc. v. Lancer Clothing Corp., 513 N.Y.S.2d 173, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
("[S]eller, by its actions in a meeting between the parties in early May 1980, repudiated the
whole contract, which repudiation permitted the buyer to suspend perfoimance .... (cita-
tions omitted)).
80. See, e.g., Cobb v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 P.2d 84, 88 (Cal. 1935) ("There can be
no anticipatory breach of a unilateral contract."); Harris v. Time, Inc., 237 Cal. Rptr. 584,
588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he doctrine of anticipatory breach-by which an anticipatory
repudiation will support an action for breach of contract without further performance by
the plaintiff-is not applicable to unilateral contracts. The rationale is that the aggrieved
party has already fully performed and would not be harmed by awaiting
counterperformance at the time promised." (citations omitted)).
81. See, e.g., Minor v. Minor, 7 Cal. Rptr. 455, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) ("Since the
bilateral contract had been fully performed by the wife, it congealed, so far as the husband
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the non-repudiating promisee has not yet fully performed, she can imme-
diately sue the repudiating promisor, even though the latter's only con-
tractual obligation is to pay the promisee money in exchange for her as-
yet-incomplete performance. 82 A number of leading commentators-in-
cluding both Professor Corbin 83 and Professor Williston, 84 who otherwise
disagreed on the advisability of permitting a promisee to sue for anticipa-
tory breach prior to the time the promisor's performance was due-and a
slowly growing number of courts have questioned the logic behind ex-
cluding unilateral contracts (and bilateral contracts made unilateral by
virtue of one party's performance) from the doctrine's reach. 85 Thus far,
however, theirs is not the prevailing view.
was concerned, into a unilateral contract .... [T]he trial court's ruling that the doctrine of
anticipatory breach does not apply to a contract which has become unilateral because of
the opposite party's full performance finds uncontradicted support in California law.");
Long Island R.R. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 362 N.E.2d 558, 563 (N.Y. 1977) ("The doc-
trine of anticipatory breach has not generally been applied to all types of contracts, its
application being limited ordinarily to bilateral contracts embodying some mutual and in-
terdependent conditions and obligations.... For the doctrine to apply there must be 'some
dependency of performances.' For this reason, a party who has fully performed cannot
invoke the doctrine even though the other party has repudiated." (citation omitted));
Sethre v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 591 P.2d 838, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) ("The doctrine of
anticipatory breach of contract does not apply because Sethre and the others, by working
for the Association over a period of years, had fulfilled all of their obligations under the
pension agreements. An anticipatory breach cannot occur where one party has performed
all of his duties under the contract.").
82. See, e.g., Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y. v. W. Pac. Ry., 244 F. 485, 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1917) ("[I]f performance remains mutually executory, the doctrine still applies, even
though the promise is only to pay money, because that is the situation in the ordinary
contract of sale repudiated by the buyer."), affd, 250 F. 327 (2d Cir. 1918).
83. Professor Corbin argued that the exclusion of unilateral contracts is
based upon the erroneous idea that the reason for holding an anticipatory
repudiation to be a breach of contract is that otherwise the injured party
must himself continue to be ready to perform on his own part. It would
follow from this that, if the injured party never had any performance to
render on his part, or, having such a performance, has already fully per-
formed it, it would not be necessary for his protection to give him an immedi-
ate action for damages for the anticipatory breach .... [T]he rule allowing an
action for an anticipatory breach cannot properly be rested upon this reason.
The reasons upon which it can actually be sustained are equally applicable to
unilateral contracts. The harm caused to the plaintiff is equally great in ei-
ther case; and it seems strange to deny to a plaintiff a remedy of this kind
merely on the ground that he has already fully performed as his contract has
required.
4 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 864-65 (1951) (footnote omitted).
84. Professor Williston wrote that the reasons supporting the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation are
as applicable to unilateral obligations to pay money, for instance by promis-
sory note, as to any other form of contract. Indeed, the right to the
unimpeached efficacy of the obligation before its maturity is perhaps as de-
sirable in the case of a promissory note as in any other case which can be
put; ... nor is it easy to draw a distinction between unilateral promises to pay
money and unilateral promises for other performances.
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2381 (1920). Thus, if one were to concede
the viability of a right to sue before the performance date, Williston saw no rational basis
for limiting that right to mutually executory bilateral contracts.
85. See Rowley, supra note 31, at 569-71, 604, and the sources cited therein. Judge
Posner recently added his voice to the growing chorus:
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It is easy to imagine that the same courts which refuse to afford a claim
for anticipatory repudiation to a promisee whose promisor's sole (re-
maining) promise is to pay money would, likewise, refuse to afford a
claim for anticipatory repudiation to a letter of credit beneficiary whose
issuer's sole promise is to pay money. And yet, reality is not always as we
imagine it.
II. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
Now, suppose that, before agreeing to sell an automobile to A for
$15,000, B insists that A obtain an irrevocable letter of credit in B's favor
to insure A's promise to pay B the purchase price on July 1. Suppose,
further, that A arranges to have Issuing National Bank ("INB") issue an
irrevocable standby letter of credit in B's favor in the amount of $15,000,
payable at any time within thirty days after July 1, upon B's presentation
of the certificate of title to the automobile and a sworn affidavit evidenc-
ing A's failure to pay B as promised. While INB is not obligated to honor
the letter of credit until at least July 2, and then only if A defaults on his
payment obligation to B, must INB (as was true for A in the earlier hypo-
thetical) refrain from repudiating, at any time prior to B's presentation,
its promise to honor B's conforming presentation?
Why the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation should be so limited eludes our
understanding. Announcement by the other party that he has no intention of
paying should entitle the prospective victim of the payor's breach to take
immediate steps to protect his interest, as by suing. Against this it has been
argued that the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation "will not intercede to
rescue the promisee from the consequences of the absence of an acceleration
clause." That gets it backwards.... Acceleration clauses are a standard
contract provision for protecting the payee against the consequences of a
breach by the other party; they would be unnecessary were it not for the rule
carving out the completed-performance case from the operation of the doc-
trine of anticipatory repudiation.
Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Basic Am. Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 911, 915-




Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code 86 and common law 87 both
86. See U.C.C. § 5-111(a) (1995) ("If an issuer ...repudiates its obligation to pay
money under a letter of credit before presentation, the beneficiary, successor, or nomi-
nated person . . . may recover from the issuer the amount that is the subject of the...
repudiation."); U.C.C. § 5-115(2) (1962) ("When an issuer wrongfully cancels or otherwise
repudiates a credit before presentment of a draft or demand for payment drawn under it
the beneficiary has the rights of a seller after anticipatory repudiation by the buyer under
§ 2-610 ....").
Each state (and the District of Columbia) has a corresponding statutory provision. ALA.
CODE § 7-5-111(a) (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.111(a) (Michie 2001); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47-5111(A) (West 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-5-111(a) (Michie 2001); CAL. COM.
CODE § 5111(a) (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-5-111(a) (West 2001); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-5-111(a) (West Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 5-111(a)
(1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:5-111(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 675.111(1) (West Supp.
2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-5-111(a) (Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:5-111(a) (1999);
IDAHO CODE § 28-5-111(1) (Michie 2001); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 810, T 5/5-111(a)
(West Supp. 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-5.1-111(a) (Michie Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 554.5111(1) (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-5-111(a) (1996); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 355.5-111(1) (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-111(a) (West 2001); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 5-1111(1) (West Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 5-
111(a) (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 5-111(a) (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 440.5111(1) (West Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.5-111(a) (West 2002);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-5-111(a) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-111(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-5-131(1) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 5-111(a)
(Lexis 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.5111.1 (Michie 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 382-A:5-111(a) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:5-111(a) (West Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 55-5-111(a) (Michie Supp. 2001); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-111(a) (McKinney 2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-5-111(a) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-05-11(1) (1999); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 1305.10(A) (West Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 5-111(a) (West
1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 75.1110(1) (1999); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5111(a) (West
Supp. 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-5-111(a) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-5-111(a) (Law.
Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-5-111(a) (Michie 2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-5-111(a) (2001); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.111(a) (Vernon 2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-5-111(1) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 5-111(a) (2001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.5A-111(a) (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.5-111(1) (West
Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE § 46-5-111(a) (2001); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 405.115(1) (West
1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-5-111(a) (Michie 2001).
87. See, e.g., Ddcor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893,
906 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays
Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 172 (N.Y. 1975); Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank,
N.A., 606 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (all finding a cause of action for antici-
patory repudiation of a letter of credit in New York common law).
Common-law recognition was very important in New York, prior to its adoption of Re-
vised Article 5 in 2000, because New York's version of former Article 5 contained a non-
uniform provision to the effect that, if the parties to a letter of credit expressly or impliedly
agreed that the letter of credit would be governed by the applicable UCP, see supra note
37, then Article 5 did not apply to the letter of credit. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKin-
ney 1993) ("Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of credit ... if
by its terms or by agreement, course of dealings or usage of trade such letter of credit ... is
subject in whole or in part to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documen-
tary Credits .... ); see, e.g., Dgcor by Nikkei, 497 F. Supp. at 907 ("[S]ince the letters of
credit issued by CBN in favor of Nikkei and East Europe expressly state that the UCP was
to govern the terms thereof, Article 5 of the New York U.C.C. and the remedies contained
therein do not apply to these actions."). Because the UCP were-and remain-silent on
the issue of anticipatory repudiation, see Engel Indus., Inc. v. First Am. Bank, N.A., 798 F.
Supp. 9, 13 (D.D.C. 1992), New York courts looked to pre-Code New York common law to
decide claims of anticipatory repudiation of a letter of credit prior to New York's adoption
of Revised Article 5. See, e.g., De Smeth v. Bank of N.Y., 879 F. Supp. 13,15 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ("Defendant maintains that plaintiff cannot bring an action for anticipatory repudia-
tion of the letter of credit ... since the UCP provides an exclusive remedy for plaintiff.
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recognize that the issuer of an irrevocable 88 letter of credit is capable of
anticipatorily repudiating its payment obligation to the beneficiary of the
This argument is rejected. Since the UCP is silent on the issue of anticipatory repudiation,
I must look to New York state law to determine if plaintiff may recover damages. A claim
for anticipatory repudiation is clearly permissible in letter of credit cases under New York
law .... (citations omitted)); D~cor by Nikkei, 497 F. Supp. at 906-07 (finding that, be-
cause "[t]he UCP is silent, however, as to the remedies available to a beneficiary of a letter
of credit where there has been a unilateral amendment of an irrevocable letter of credit by
the issuer," the beneficiaries could "seek relief for the anticipatory repudiation of the cred-
its under applicable pre-Code state law"). See generally Chantayan, supra note 33, at 204-
06.
The volume and consistency of cases finding a cause of action for anticipatory repudia-
tion of a letter of credit in New York common law is remarkable, given the widespread
refusal to recognize a comparable cause of action for anticipatory repudiation of other
unilateral or unilaterally executory obligations. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Alabama, Arizona, and Missouri added similar non-uniform provisions to their enact-
ments of former Article 5. See ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-5102(D) (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (West 1994). There are no re-
ported decisions indicating in what source of law Alabama, Arizona, or Missouri courts
sought or would have sought refuge had an anticipatory repudiation case arisen under their
non-uniform provisions. Indeed, there are no reported decisions applying Arizona's non-
uniform section 47-5102(D) at all. And, in the handful of Alabama and Missouri cases
invoking their former versions of non-uniform section 5-102(4), the Alabama and Missouri
courts betrayed little inclination to stray from the UCP where the UCP appeared to speak
to the issue before the court. See S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank of Ala., 709
So. 2d 1180, 1186 (Ala. 1998) (declining to read a "fraud exception" into the UCP that
would allow the issuing bank to refuse to honor a conforming presentment if the issuing
bank believed there was fraudulent information contained in the documents presented to
the issuing bank); AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Martin, 559 So. 2d 1058, 1063-64 (Ala. 1990)
(same); Waidmann v. Mercantile Trust Co., N.A., 711 S.W.2d 907, 912-14 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that issuing bank acted in accordance with the UCP's "strict compliance"
standard when it refused to honor the beneficiary's draft, which was accompanied by non-
conforming documents); see also Landmark Bank v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 748 F.
Supp. 709, 714-15 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (citing Waidmann, 711 S.W.2d 907, in support of the
proposition that Article 5 does not apply where the parties have incorporated the UCP
into their letter of credit, unless the parties so provide, and finding that the issuer improp-
erly dishonored a facially conforming draft by taking into account facts beyond the letter of
credit and the documents submitted in support of the draft, in contravention of the UCP's
version of the independence principle). But see Germania Bank v. Brehm, 763 F. Supp.
1030, 1032 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (construing a provision in the letter of credit saying it was "to
be governed and construed in accordance with Missouri law" to mean Missouri's Article 5;
thus, essentially, trumping the effect of the letter's language expressly making it subject to
the UCP).
Revised section 5-116(c), as adopted in Alabama, Arizona, Missouri, and New York,
replaces former ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-5102(D), Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 400.5-102(4), and N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4), and provides that the UCP "trump" Re-
vised Article 5 only if the letter of credit expressly incorporates the UCP, and the UCP and
Revised Article 5 conflict when applied to tht letter of credit. ALA. CODE § 7-5-116(c)
(1997); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-5116(C) (West 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-116(c)
(West Supp. 2002); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-116(c) (McKinney 2001); see supra note 40 and accom-
panying text; see, e.g., ITM Enters., Inc. v. Bank of N.Y., 754 N.Y.S.2d 663,664 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (clumsily observing that, where the parties have incorporated the UCP, but the
UCP is silent, the court may "rely upon" Revised Article 5 "since it is not in conflict with
the UCP"). Because the UCP is silent on the issue of anticipatory repudiation, section 5-
111(a) governs even if the parties have expressly agreed that their letter of credit is subject
to the UCP.
88. As a practical matter, issuers can only anticipatorily repudiate irrevocable letters
of credit, because "[r]evocable letters of credit may be modified or revoked without notice
to the .. .beneficiary." 6B HAWKLAND & MILLER, supra note 37, [Rev.] § 5-111.1; see
supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
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letter of credit before the latter presents a draft or demand for pay-
ment.89 In this respect, letters of credit are unique among the payment
devices and mechanisms governed by the Code. By comparison, Articles
3 (Negotiable Instruments) and 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) are
silent on the subject of anticipatory repudiation. 90
89. An issuer may also repudiate its obligation to the applicant who induced it to issue
the letter of credit. Revised section 5-111 does not explicitly grant the applicant a cause of
action for anticipatory repudiation by the issuer, but one leading commentator argues that
courts should see that as a "drafting error ... is not to be regarded as a prohibition of the
omitted action, and therefore ... not displac[ing] the non-Code law under which the con-
cept of liability for anticipatory repudiation of a contract has long been firmly established."
7A LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE'S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ [Rev] 5-111:16 (3d ed. 2001) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the non-Article 5
law of anticipatory repudiation, see Rowley, supra note 31.
Because the UCP500, see supra notes 1, 87, and the ISP98, see supra note 10, are both
silent on the issue of anticipatory repudiation, unless the parties have expressly chosen the
law of a jurisdiction that has not adopted Article 5, a court considering a claim or defense
of anticipatory repudiation of a letter of credit should apply revised section 5-111, even if
the parties have expressly incorporated the UCP or the ISP98. See generally Mid-Am.
Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading Ltd., 768 N.E.2d 619, 636-37 (Ohio 2002) ("[W]hen a letter of
credit expressly incorporates the terms of the UCP, but the UCP do[ ] not contain any rule
covering the issue in controversy, the UCP will not [dislplace the relevant provisions of
[Article 5].). The U.N. Convention, see supra note 34, is, likewise, silent on the topic of
anticipatory repudiation.
90. See 6 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES [Rev.] § 3-118:6 (1999) ("There is no doctrine of anticipatory repudiation on
an instrument. Despite a maker's or acceptor's proclamation that he will not pay the in-
strument when due, the holder must wait until the day after maturity to commence an
action."); see, e.g., Artistic Greetings, Inc. v. Sholom Greeting Card Co., 318 N.Y.S.2d 623,
625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) ("The time for payment is not accelerated, in the absence of an
express provision to that effect, by the fact that the maker has declared his intention not to
pay on the date when the instrument is due." (quotation omitted)). That said,
Payment is unlikely where the maker or acceptor has repudiated the obliga-
tion to pay the instrument .... Presentment in these situations would be an
idle gesture.... Rather than requiring the party to undergo the futile and
time-consuming act of presentment, presentment is excused. Notice of dis-
honor is not excused because the indorser may be unaware of the ...
repudiation.
6 HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra, [Rev.] § 3-504:6 (footnotes omitted).
Article 3 does recognize the concept of "renunciation":
A person entitled to enforce an instrument, with or without consideration,
may discharge the obligation of a party to pay the instrument (i) by an inten-
tional voluntary act, such as surrender of the instrument to the party, de-
struction, mutilation, or cancellation of the instrument, cancellation or
striking out of the party's signature, or the addition of words to the instru-
ment indicating discharge, or (ii) by agreeing not to sue or otherwise re-
nouncing rights against the party by a signed writing.
U.C.C. § 3-604(a) (1990). This section replaced former section 3-605(1)(b), but its con-
tours are unlike those of anticipatory repudiation under Articles 2, 2A, and 5. Under Arti-
cle 3, renunciation is an act by a person entitled to enforce an instrument that waives its
rights against another party. See U.C.C. § 3-604(a). See generally LARY LAWRENCE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 125 (1997). The party whose rights are affected by
the holder's renunciation is not injured by the renunciation, and thus has no need of an
avenue to redress like that provided by sections 2-610, 2A-402, former 5-115(2), and re-
vised 5-111(a) to parties who are injured by another's repudiation of, respectively, a goods
sales contract, a goods lease contract, or a letter of credit.
Article 3 also recognizes a holder's right to accelerate the payment due date of an instru-
ment otherwise payable at a definite time, see U.C.C. § 3-108(b)(ii) ("A promise or order is
'payable at a definite time' if it is payable on elapse of a definite period of time after sight
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or acceptance or at a fixed date or dates or at a time or times readily ascertainable at the
time the promise or order is issued, subject to rights of . . .(ii) acceleration ..."), or to
demand additional collateral, see id. § 3-104(a)(3)(i) ("'[N]egotiable instrument' means an
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or
other charges described in the promise or order, if it: . . .(3) Does not state any other
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in
addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertak-
ing or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment .... ."), if the holder
"deems himself insecure," or otherwise "in good faith believes that the prospect of pay-
ment .. .is impaired," U.C.C. § 1-208 (1999); see, e.g., Karner v. Willis, 710 P.2d 21, 22
(Kan. 1985) (affirming the trial and appellate courts' judgments that a bank, whose note
with the debtor contained a provision which permitted the bank to accelerate the maturity
of the debt if the bank deemed itself insecure, "acted in good faith in accelerating the debt
and in setting off the note against the debtor's bank account").
An instrument may require that the obligor furnish additional collateral....
at the will of the holder or at the option of the holder whenever he feels
insecure .... [I]n the event of the obligor's failure to furnish the additional
security [if requested], the holder may accelerate the balance of the principal
due. If the right to require additional security is at the will of the holder or at
the option of the holder whenever he deems himself insecure, the holder may
not exercise the right unless he believes in good faith that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired.
6 HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra, [Rev.] § 3-104:12 (footnotes omitted). Numerous
courts have similarly recognized an Article 9 secured creditor's right to accelerate a se-
cured indebtedness or to demand additional collateral if the secured creditor, in good faith,
deems himself insecure as to either the indebtedness or the collateral. See, e.g., Van Bibber
v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 124 (Ind. 1981); Jack M. Finley, Inc. v. Longview Bank & Trust
Co., 705 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sturman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 729 P.2d 667, 677 (Wyo. 1986). See generally Ben Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Davis,
589 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("An insecurity clause is a clause often inserted in
security agreements and promissory notes which provides that one party or his successor in
interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or additional collat-
eral when he deems himself insecure."); W. Rodney Clement, Jr., Enforcing Security Inter-
ests in Personal Property in Mississippi, 67 Miss. L.J. 43, 56 (1997) ("[M]ost security
agreements permit the secured party to declare a default and accelerate the indebtedness
when the secured party deems itself insecure or its prospect of payment impaired.").
Whether the holder's good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired should
be judged objectively or subjectively is the source of a sharp split of authority, though all
courts agree that the holder must, at least, honestly believe that the prospect of payment is
impaired. Compare, e.g., Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th
Cir. 1969) (applying Texas law), Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747 (Alaska 1975), Rich-
ards Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), and Black v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co., 437 So. 2d 26, 28-30 (Miss. 1983) (all requiring objective reasonable-
ness), with, e.g., Watseka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775, 779-81 (Ill. 1990), Quest
v. Barnett Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1021-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), Ginn v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 243 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978), Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State
Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1975), Karner, 710 P.2d at 22, Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v.
Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. 1964), Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co.,
713 S.W.2d 517, 526-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), Salsbery v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 635 P.2d
669, 672 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), and Van Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 497 P.2d 252, 254 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1972) (all requiring only subjective reasonableness). Discussing that split in de-
tail, much less attempting to resolve it, is beyond the scope of this article.
The holder of a negotiable instrument payable on demand (or payable at a fixed date or
on demand) may demand payment at a date earlier than anticipated without even a good
faith belief that the prospect of future payment is impaired. See U.C.C. § 1-208 cmt.; see,
e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th
Cir. 1990); Taggart & Taggart Seed, Inc. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 684 F. Supp. 230, 235-36
(E.D. Ark. 1988), affd, 881 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir. 1989); Dominion Bank, N.A. v. Moore, 688
F. Supp. 1084, 1086-87 (W.D. Va. 1988); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81
B.R. 194, 199 (D. Mass. 1987); Pavco Indus., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 534 So. 2d
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To succeed on a claim for anticipatory repudiation of a letter of credit,
a beneficiary must prove9 that the issuer clearly and unconditionally
demonstrated its intent not to perform or its inability to perform as and
when promised. 92 This is the same standard Article 2 applies to plaintiffs
572, 576-77 (Ala. 1988); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336,
1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 269 S.E.2d
916, 918-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Christie v. First Am. Bank, 908 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1995); Waller v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 620 A.2d 381, 390-91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993);
Centerre Bank of Kansas City, N.A. v. Distribs., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 46-48 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); Solar Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chadron, 545 N.W.2d 714, 719-20 (Neb.
1996); Simon v. N.H. Savs. Bank, 296 A.2d 913, 915 (N.H. 1972); Allied Sheet Metal
Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 518 P.2d 734, 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(all finding that a holder owes no duty of good faith in calling a demand note). But cf.
Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law and
finding that a holder must act in good faith when accelerating a note containing both a
monthly payment schedule and a payable-on-demand clause). See generally 5A RONALD
A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-108:3 (3d ed. 1994)
("The obligation of good faith does not apply to demand instruments."); 2 THOMAS D.
CRANDALL ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14.13.3 (1993 & Supp. 2002). Simi-
larly, where the instrument authorizes acceleration upon the obligor's default, the Code
does not require the accelerating holder to have a good faith belief that the prospect of
future payment is impaired. See, e.g., Bowen v. Danna, 637 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Ark. 1982);
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Cermack, 658 So. 2d 1352, 1357 (Miss. 1995), overruled on
other grounds by Adams v. United States Homecrafters, Inc., 744 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999);
Glenfed Fin. Corp. v. Penick Corp., 647 A.2d 852, 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (all
holding that section 1-208 does not apply to a note that provides for acceleration upon
default). See generally 5A ANDERSON, supra, § 3-109:34 ("When a note.., provides [that]
the holder has the option of accelerating it upon default .... there is no limitation that the
acceleration must be in good faith." (footnotes omitted)).
This right to accelerate-at least to the extent that it is based on the holder's good faith
insecurity-is somewhat akin to the right of a promisee under Article 2 or Article 2A to
demand adequate assurances from its promisor if the promisee has "reasonable grounds
for insecurity ... with respect to the [promisor's] performance." U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1989);
id. § 2A-401(2). The obvious difference, of course, is that the Article 2 or 2A promisor can
satisfy its promisee's insecurity by providing adequate assurances within a reasonable time,
not to exceed thirty days. By contrast, if a holder demands payment in full pursuant to an
acceleration clause, Article 3 provides no statutory means for the obligor to "decelerate"
or otherwise avoid making payment in full. See U.C.C. § 3-304(b)(3) (1990) ("If a due date
with respect to principal has been accelerated, the instrument becomes overdue on the day
after the accelerated due date.").
91. The beneficiary alleging anticipatory repudiation bears the burden of proof. See,
e.g., Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cont'l Bank, N.A., 725 F. Supp. 383, 388 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
affd, 918 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990); Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 41 n.3
(Colo. 1981) (en banc).
In Occidental Fire & Casualty, the district court found that the beneficiary (Occidental)
failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the issuer (Continental) had
reduced the face value of the letter of credit without Occidental's consent. Occidental Fire
& Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. at 388-89. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit freely admitted that,
had the burden of proof been on Continental, rather than Occidental, Continental likely
could not have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it had Occidental's consent
to reduce the face value of the letter of credit. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 918 F.2d at
1323.
92. See, e.g., De Smeth v. Bank of N.Y., 879 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("To
succeed on a claim for anticipatory repudiation of a letter of credit, plaintiff must be able
to show that defendant clearly demonstrated its intent not to continue with perform-
ance ...."); Colo. Nat'l Bank, 634 P.2d at 41 n.3 ("We cannot conclude ... that the Bank
anticipatorily repudiated its obligation to honor drafts under letter of credit numbers 1156
and 1157. The Bank merely indicated that it should not be required to honor drafts unless
the County had incurred or committed to incur expenses to complete the road improve-
2258 [Vol. 56
LETTERS OF CREDIT
who allege that the defendant anticipatorily repudiated a contract for the
sale of goods. 93 Because Article 5 does not define "repudiation," 94 courts
must look elsewhere for guidance on what types of words and actions
constitute anticipatory repudiation. Section 2-610 is a logical place to
look, given that former section 5-115(2) gave the beneficiary whose issuer
had repudiated or cancelled prior to presentment "the rights of a seller
after anticipatory repudiation by the buyer under Section 2-610, ' ' 95 and
that, at least in the context of a commercial letter of credit, the benefici-
ary is a seller of goods.96 While revised section 5-111(a) lacks the explicit
reference to section 2-610, there is no reason to expect courts to change
their practice of referring to section 2-610 and the body of case law that
has developed around it to decide whether an issuer has anticipatorily
repudiated. And, in any event, the vast majority of courts apply essen-
tially the same standard to common law anticipatory repudiation claims.97
The beneficiary may also have to prove that she was ready, willing, and
able to perform, or to tender performance as and when promised. This
does not mean that the beneficiary must present a conforming draft or
demand as a precondition for bringing suit over the issuer's anticipatory
repudiation. 98 Nor does it mean that the beneficiary must perform or
tender performance of the underlying obligation if the issuer's repudia-
tion has made it clear that any such performance or tender would not
induce the issuer to perform under the letter of credit. 99 Thus, in Engel
Industries, Inc. v. First American Bank, N.A.,1 00 the court made quick
work of the repudiating issuer's argument that it was excused from per-
ments not that it would not honor the County's drafts unless this condition had been
met.").
93. See supra note 63.
94. See 2 THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY
& LAW DIGEST § 5-115[A][3] (2d ed. 2001).
95. U.C.C. § 5-115(2) (1962).
96. See 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89, § 5-115:6 ("The refusal of the issuer to make
payment under the [commercial letter of] credit is, for all practical purposes, the same as
the buyer refusing to make payment. As a result, the damages that the beneficiary/seller
will suffer by a[n issuer's repudiation] of a commercial letter of credit are the same as that
of a seller of goods.").
97. See, e.g., Wolgin v. Atlas United Fin. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (E.D. Pa.
1975) ("An anticipatory breach of a contract occurs whenever there has been a definite
and unconditional repudiation of a contract by one party communicated to another."),
affd, 530 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1976); Neptune Research & Dev., Inc. v. Teknics Indus. Sys.,
Inc., 563 A.2d 465, 470 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("An anticipatory breach is a
definite and unconditional declaration by a party to an executory contract-through word
or conduct-that he will not or cannot render the agreed upon performance.").
98. See U.C.C. § 5-111(a) (1995) ("In the case of repudiation the claimant need not
present any document."); see also 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 19.02[2] (advising that a bene-
ficiary need not make a conforming presentation "if the issuer indicates in advance that it
will not honor a conforming presentation").
99. See, e.g., Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225, 238 (N.Y. App. Div.
1926) (holding that the defendant's repudiation of the letter of credit relieved the plaintiff
of any obligation to purchase the coal it had contracted to purchase from a third party and
then resell to the defendant).
100. 798 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1992) (applying former Article 5).
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forming under the letter of credit because the beneficiary never made the
requisite presentment:
First American repudiated the letter of credit before it expired, indi-
cating to Engel that any presentation would be futile. Moreover,
when Engel sought to preserve its rights and tried to perform its obli-
gations under the letter of credit, First American prevented Engel
from making presentation until the letter of credit expired. There is
undisputed evidence that Engel was prepared to make presentation,
that it had delivered the goods FOB its warehouse, and that presen-
tation was not made only because First American's agent, the advis-
ing bank, would not accept presentment.
[B]eneficiaries of letters of credit cannot be allowed to collect with-
out first meeting all of their obligations. . . . [B]ut to honor First
American's defense would be to carry the concept of strict compli-
ance to an extreme. In this case, Engel has complied with its obliga-
tions including the preparation of necessary documents .... First
American cannot now prevail by claiming that Engel failed to do
something First American specifically blocked Engel from
doing .... 101
The issuer's repudiation notwithstanding, however, a beneficiary who
could not have presented a conforming draft or demand may be unable to
recover for the issuer's anticipatory repudiation.10 2 This is true even if
101. Id. at 14-15; see also, e.g., Procter & Gamble Cellulose Co. v. Investbanka Beo-
grad, 4 Fed. Appx. 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he formality of presenting the documents...
does not apply where, in instances such as this, the issuing bank anticipatorily repudiated
the letters of credit, by indicating a clear intention not to perform its obligation, before the
expiration of the period of presentment."), affig, No. 98 Civ. 2359 (JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5636, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2000) (finding no duty to tender further conforming
drafts after the issuing bank refused to honor the beneficiary's first two conforming drafts);
Clement v. FDIC, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1017, 1023 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (finding no duty to
tender documents under former § 5-115(2) when presentment would be futile due to a
prior renunciation by the issuer); Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 613 N.Y.S.2d 538,
539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) ("[A]fter Citibank had dishonored th[e] four drafts requesting
payment, plaintiff Ross Bicycles was not obliged to continue futilely presenting drafts and
could recover for the anticipatory breach of the balance of the letter of credit.").
ISP98 may alter this rule with regard to standby letters of credit that are subject to
ISP98-at least in cases like Procter & Gamble Cellulose and Ross Bicycles where wrongful
dishonor by the issuer of one or more conforming drafts was deemed a repudiation of the
issuer's Article 5 obligation to honor future conforming drafts. See ISP98, supra note 10,
R. 3.07(b) ("Wrongful dishonour of a complying presentation does not constitute dishon-
our of any other presentation under a standby or repudiation of the standby."). See gener-
ally WUNNICKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 6.04[B] (discussing R. 3.07(b) and concluding that
its drafters appear to have intended to overturn the general rule that a beneficiary is not
required to present documents if, prior to presentation, the issuer unambiguously repudi-
ates its obligation to honor them). ISP98 rules only apply to letters of credit that specifi-
cally incorporate them by reference. See id. § 6.01.
102. See U.C.C. § 5-111 cmt. 1 ("[I]f a beneficiary could never have obtained docu-
ments necessary for a presentation conforming to the letter of credit, the beneficiary can-
not recover for anticipatory repudiation of the letter of credit."); see, e.g., Clement, 2 UCC
Rep. Serv. 2d at 1023 (implying such a requirement in former section 5-115(2)); Ddcor by
Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd,
647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Ufitec, S.A. v. Trade Bank & Trust Co., 249 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560
(N.Y. App. Div. 1964), affd, 209 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1965) (both finding such a requirement
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the issuer had previously accepted nonconforming documents'0 3 or if
routine practice permitted payment despite the nonconformity.10 4
A. REPUDIATORY WORDS OR CONDUCT
What sort of behavior clearly and unconditionally demonstrates an is-
suer's intent not to perform, or its inability to perform, as and when
promised? While the cases applying former section 5-115(2) or current
section 5-111(a) are certainly not in legion, some patterns emerge.
1. Cancellation or Renunciation
As is true more generally under common law105 and under the more
frequently litigated provisions of the Code dealing with anticipatory repu-
in pre-Code N.Y. law). But see Atari, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 599 F. Supp. 592,
600 (N.D. I11. 1984) (finding no requirement in former section 5-115(2) that a plaintiff
demonstrate that, but for the defendant's repudiation, it was ready, willing, and able to
make a conforming tender of documents), affd in part and rev'd in part, 785 F.2d 312 (7th
Cir. 1986).
In Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 606 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the
Appellate Division stated that the plaintiff must show its readiness, willingness, and ability
to perform, but cited as its sole authority a case-United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting
Goods Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943 (N.Y. 1976)-which nowhere discusses whether the plaintiff
was ready, willing, and able to perform notwithstanding the defendant's repudiation. On
remand, the trial court found that the "[p]laintiff clearly established that it could easily
have ... satisf[ied] the terms of the letter of credit"-and was, therefore, entitled to re-
cover the face value of the letter of credit where the defendant had repudiated before the
plaintiff made any draws against the letter. See Ross Bicycles, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
Former section 5-115 has no counterpart to the passage quoted above from Official
Comment 1 to revised section 5-111. See U.C.C. § 5-115 cmts. 1-3 (1962). Despite this fact,
and despite the conflicting authority cited above, Professors White and Summers appear to
take it as given that "when beneficiary learns of the repudiation before procuring the re-
quired documents, it need not follow through with a complying presentation, but benefici-
ary must nevertheless show that it was 'ready, willing, and able' to do so. If beneficiary
cannot show this, it will have no damage claim against issuer under 5-115." 3 JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER TREATISE
SERIES 208 (4th ed. 1995) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). It is interesting to note
that Professors White and Summers include Atari in the footnote wherein they cite the
authorities purportedly supporting this obligation-despite the fact that the Atari court
found no such obligation in former section 5-115(2). Id. Professors Crandall, Herbert, and
Lawrence address the issue more circumspectly: "Some courts have added the requirement
that the beneficiary show that she could have performed the contract in order to recover
from an issuer that anticipatorily repudiated a credit." 3 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 90,
§ 21.8.3.
103. De Smeth, 879 F. Supp. at 14-15.
104. Id. at 15.
105. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 582 F.2d 1321, 1325
(4th Cir. 1978) ("[I]f one party to a contract declares in advance that he will not perform at
the time set for his performance, the other party may bring an immediate action for total
breach of the contract."); Wolgin v. Atlas United Fin. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) ("A statement by a party that he will not or cannot perform in accordance with
[the] agreement creates ... an anticipatory breach."), affd, 530 F.2d 963 (3rd Cir. 1976);
Farwell Constr. Co. v. Ticktin, 376 N.E.2d 621, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) ("When a party to
an executory contract gives notice of his intention not to comply with his obligations or
otherwise repudiates his obligations before the time of performance, the other party may
treat such notice as an anticipatory breach and regard the contract as terminated."). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1979).
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diation of contracts for the sale of goods, 106 an issuer who cancels or oth-
erwise renounces its obligations under a letter of credit anticipatorily
repudiates the letter of credit. 10 7
For example, in Atari, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank,10 8 Atari
sold consumer electronics to S-W Distributors on an open account, se-
cured by a $400,000 irrevocable standby letter of credit issued by Harris
on March 9, 1982 in Atari's favor.'0 9 In order to draw against the letter
of credit, Atari had to present documents stating, inter alia, that the
amount Atari sought to draw was in excess of the $500,000 open account
Atari had established for S-W.110 On November 2, 1982, Harris unilater-
ally amended the letter of credit to raise the "floor" so that Atari could
not draw against the letter in an amount less than $1,000,000.111 While
this act, by itself, was an anticipatory repudiation of the irrevocable letter
of credit, 112 the Atari court focused its analysis on a December 22, 1983113
letter from Harris notifying Atari that, as of December 10, 1983, the letter
of credit "should be considered null and void."'1 14 Atari informed Harris
five days later that, because the letter of credit was irrevocable, Atari
expected Harris to honor any proper demand for payment. On January
31, 1984, Atari attempted to draw $395,391.68, and submitted to Harris
documentation including invoices totaling $2,120,679.115 Harris refused
to honor Atari's draft due to alleged nonconformities in the documents
106. See supra note 64.
107. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Cellulose Co. v. Investbanka Beograd, No. 98 Civ.
2359 (JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5636, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2000) (holding that the
issuing bank, which refused to honor two conforming drafts and then recalled the letters of
credit from advising bank prior to their expiration, had anticipatorily repudiated because
"it was clear that [the issuing bank] would not pay under the letters of credit"), affd, No.
00-7461, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2434 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2001); Engel Indus., Inc. v. First Am.
Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 9, 11-13 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the issuing bank, which
wrote beneficiary to inform it that the bank would not "mak[e] payment under" the letter
of credit "at this time," had anticipatorily repudiated because, at the same time, the issuing
bank wrote the advising bank that it would not pay under any circumstances); J. Zeevi &
Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 170-72 (N.Y. 1975) (holding
that the issuing bank, which-on instructions from the Bank of Uganda-informed its New
York agent to cancel the letter of credit and not to effect payment against it, "was guilty of
an anticipatory breach of contract and became liable for damages caused the beneficiary"
of the cancelled letter); see also Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225, 238
(N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (holding, under pre-Code common law, that the defendant anticipa-
torily repudiated when it wrote the beneficiary some thirty days before the letter of credit
should have expired that the credit had already expired). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra
note 11, $ 9.02[2]; 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89, § 5-115:13.
108. 599 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. I11. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part, 785 F.2d 312 (7th
Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 594.
110. Id. at 595.
111. Id.
112. See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text.
113. The court at one point refers to Harris having written this letter to Atari on De-
cember 27. Atari, 599 F. Supp. at 595. This appears to be a typographical error in the
court's opinion, as everywhere else it indicates that Harris wrote the letter on December
22. Id. at 599, 600 n.4, 601.




Atari presented. 116 Atari sued Harris for anticipatory repudiation.
While admitting that it had made an irrevocable promise to pay, 117
Harris argued that: (1) the UCP, incorporated by the letter of credit, gov-
erned its transaction with Atari rather than former section 5-115(2);118
(2) Harris's December 22 letter did not amount to a repudiation; 119
(3) Atari's reply to Harris's December 22 letter waived any repudiation
by Harris;120 (4) Atari's January 31, 1984 draw waived any repudiation by
Harris; 21 and (5) Atari failed to show (or even allege) that it was ready,
willing, and able to perform by presenting a conforming demand for pay-
ment under the letter of credit. 122
The court found for Atari on all points.123 First, the court found that
former section 5-115(2) applied, notwithstanding Harris's authority to the
contrary, because Harris cited only New York cases applying a non-uni-
form statutory provision 24 for which Illinois had no counterpart, and be-
cause prior Illinois cases had applied Article 5 even when the letter of
credit explicitly incorporated the UCP.125 Second, the court found that
116. Id. Harris's refusal to honor Atari's draft, standing alone, might have supported a
claim for wrongful dishonor under former section 5-115. U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1962). How-
ever, while the extent and consequence of nonconformities in Atari's documents were
hotly disputed by both parties, see Atari, 599 F. Supp. at 595-99, Harris did not dispute any
of the facts supporting Atari's claim that Harris's December 1983 letter constituted an
anticipatory repudiation (though it did dispute the legal consequence of those facts), id. at
599 & n.2. Rather, Harris rested its defense of Atari's anticipatory repudiation claim on
the bases discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 118-22.
117. Atari, 599 F. Supp. at 599.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 599 n.2.
120. Id. at 600 n.4.
121. Id. at 601.
122. Id. at 600.
123. The court, for its own purposes, also considered and rejected the argument that
Harris had somehow retracted its prior repudiation when it considered, and then dishon-
ored as nonconforming, Atari's January 31 draw.
If proper, Harris' dishonor of Atari's attempted draw, citing nonconformi-
ties with the terms of the credit, would amount to... a retraction of its prior
repudiation....
But Atari maintains that Harris' reliance upon the credit terms was merely
a pretext. Atari contends that Harris' dishonor was actually based on Harris'
position that the credit was no longer effective. Accepting Atari's argument
necessarily leads to the conclusion that whenever an issuer has repudiated a
letter of credit and its subsequent dishonor is ultimately determined to be
wrongful by a court, the issuer is subject to liability under a theory of antici-
patory breach as well as for the wrongful dishonor. Although this result pro-
vides a disappointed beneficiary with duplicate causes of action, this is
exactly the result contemplated by the Official Comments to the UCC. ...
Nor does this result do violence to those decisions requiring a beneficiary to
meet the requirements of the credit should it attempt to draw on the credit
after a repudiation. Only a wrongful dishonor, which necessarily includes a
conforming draw, should be viewed as a continued repudiation. Should the
issuer properly dishonor an attempted draw made subsequent to its repudia-
tion, it has performed under the credit and retracted its repudiation.
Id. at 601 (footnote and citations omitted).
124. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1993), superseded by N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-116(c)
(McKinney 2001) (effective Nov. 1, 2000); see supra note 87.
125. See Atari, 599 F. Supp. at 600.
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Harris's statement that Atari should consider the letter of credit "null and
void" was "a clear statement by a promisor to its promisee that it will not
perform"-and, therefore, it was a repudiation. 126 Third, applying sec-
tion 2-610 by analogy, 127 the court held that Atari's reply to Harris's De-
cember 22 letter, demanding that Harris honor the letter of credit, did not
waive Atari's right to sue Harris for anticipatory repudiation.128 Fourth,
the court held that Atari's presentment on January 31, 1984 was "no more
than a further urging that Harris retract its repudiation and perform" as
promised-and, again, did not waive Atari's right to sue Harris for antici-
patorily repudiating the letter of credit.' 29 And, fifth, the court, without
conceding that former section 5-115(2) actually required a non-repudiat-
ing beneficiary to show that it was ready, willing, and able to perform in
order to recover for an issuer's repudiation, 130 held that Atari clearly was
ready, willing, and able to perform, as evidenced by its January 31 presen-
tation of conforming documents supporting a draw of $395,391.68 against
the letter of credit. 31
In Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Board of Commissioners,132
CNB issued three irrevocable letters of credit in favor of Routt County to
secure an obligation by Woodmoor to perform, or pay for, certain road
improvements called for in a series of subdivision improvement agree-
126. Id. at 599 n.2.
127. Section 2-610, which governs anticipatory repudiation of contracts for the sale of
goods, allows a non-repudiating party to, without waiving his right to immediately pursue
any remedy afforded by section 2-610, "notif[y] the repudiating party that he would await
the latter's performance and . . . urge[ ] retraction." U.C.C. § 2-610(b) (1989); see supra
note 77. This is consistent with common law that developed following the adoption of the
Code. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS, supra note 105, § 257 ("The injured
party does not change the effect of a repudiation by urging the repudiator to perform in
spite of his repudiation or to retract his repudiation."); see, e.g., Gaglia v. Kirchner, 721
A.2d 1028, 1031 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (observing that the non-breaching party
"may choose to attempt to persuade the breaching party to retract his repudiation and to
perform," but "is not required to do so").
128. See Atari, 599 F. Supp. at 600 n.4.
129. See id. at 601.
130. The court found,
under Article Five of the UCC, it is not clear that Atari is required to show
that it was ready, willing and able to perform. Section 5-115(2) expressly
contemplates a situation where the beneficiary may sue the issuer for repudi-
ation and still "avoid procurement of the required documents." In other
words, there is no requirement that the beneficiary demonstrate that it could
present a conforming draw.
Id. at 600.
The Atari court then cited two New York cases-Reprosystem, B. V. v. SCM Corp., 522
F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1983), and
Dgcor by Nikkei International, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981)-as contrary authority. However, as the
Atari court had earlier observed, New York had at the time a non-uniform provision in its
version of Article 5 stating that, where the parties expressly incorporated the UCP in their
letter of credit, the UCP displaced former Article 5. Therefore, the New York cases cited
by the Atari court did not find a "ready, willing, and able" requirement in Article 5, they
found it in New York pre-Code common law. See supra note 87.
131. See Atari, 589 F. Supp. at 600.
132. 634 P.2d 32 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
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ments.133 When Woodmoor failed to make any improvements, the
county made a demand on CNB under the letter of credit. CNB dishon-
ored all of the county's drafts, and the county sued for wrongful dis-
honor. 134 The county also sued CNB on the theory of anticipatory
repudiation, alleging that CNB had imposed a precondition-that the
county have actually incurred, or committed to incur, any expenses for
which it sought reimbursement before it could draw against the letters of
credit-which was not part of the terms under which the letters were
issued. 135
In contrast to Atari's clear and unconditional "null and void" language,
the only evidence the county presented at trial of CNB's repudiation was
CNB's sworn answer to an interrogatory that, prior to the expiration date
of the letters of credit, CNB had notified the county that CNB "should
make payments under the letters of credit ... only as the [county] in-
curred or committed to incur expenses for the particular improvements
called for in the Subdivision Improvement Agreements.' 36 Far from be-
ing an "overt communication of intention or an action which renders per-
formance impossible or demonstrates a clear determination not to
continue with performance,' ' 137 the Colorado Supreme Court found in-
sufficient evidence of anticipatory repudiation in the foregoing statement:
We cannot conclude ... that the Bank anticipatorily repudiated its
obligation to honor drafts under letter of credit numbers 1156 and
1157. The Bank merely indicated that it should not be required to
honor drafts unless the County had incurred or committed to incur
expenses to complete the road improvements not that it would not
honor the County's drafts unless this condition had been met.138
While the court could have explained a bit more clearly why CNB's
statement could not be a repudiation, it seems as if there are at least two
possible "spins" to put on CNB's "should." CNB could have been saying
"If life was fair, we should only have to pay you if you actually incurred
or committed to incur the expenses; however, because the letters don't
actually say that, we will honor any conforming drafts." Such a statement
would clearly not be an anticipatory repudiation, because CNB did not
say it could not or would not honor conforming drafts, it just said it did
not want to.139 Alternatively, CNB could have been attempting to intro-
duce a new term. As long as CNB did not insist on the new term and
refuse to perform without it,1 40 merely proposing a new term is not an
133. Id. at 34.
134. Id. at 34-35.
135. Id. at 41 n.3.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-610 cmt. 1) (1973)).
138. Id.
139. Cf. Barz v. Geneva Elevator Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 943, 961 (N.D. Iowa 1998)
("[P]osturing over the legality of the contracts ... does not as a matter of law demonstrate
a clear determination not to continue with performance, nor does it expressly renounce the
contracts and announce an intention not to perform." (quotations omitted)).




2. Imposing or Insisting Upon New or Modified Terms
As is also true more generally under common law, 142 and under the
more frequently litigated provisions of the Code dealing with anticipatory
repudiation of contracts for the sale of goods, 14 3 an issuer who unilater-
ally amends the terms of a letter of credit, or who insists, as a precondi-
tion to performance, on different terms than those set forth in the letter
of credit, anticipatorily repudiates the letter of credit. 44 This is consis-
tent with former section 5-106(2) and revised section 5-106(b), both of
which provide that post-issuance amendments of irrevocable letters of
credit are ineffective unless and until consented to by all parties. 45 It is
also consistent with Article 9(d) of the UCP, which provides that, except
in the case of a transferable credit (as defined by UCP Article 48(a)), an
irrevocable letter of credit "can neither be amended nor cancelled with-
out the agreement of the Issuing Bank, the Confirming Bank, if any, and
141. See, e.g., Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 377 (8th Cir. 1980) ("A
suggestion for modification of a contract does not amount to a repudiation unless the party
makes it clear that he will not perform without the modification."); Wooten v. DeMean,
788 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ("Mere requests to change the terms of a contract
are not, in and of themselves, enough to constitute repudiation."); accord Truman L. Flatt
& Sons Co. v. Schupf, 649 N.E.2d 990, 994 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (following Unique Systems
and Wooten).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 105, § 250 cmt. b
("[L]anguage that under a fair reading 'amounts to a statement of intention not to perform
except on conditions which go beyond the contract' constitutes a repudiation." (quoting
U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (1989)); see, e.g., REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 538 F.2d 953,
955 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[I]nsistence upon terms which are not contained in a contract consti-
tutes an anticipatory repudiation thereof."); Beeson v. McDonald, 347 S.E.2d 485, 486-87
(N.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("When plaintiff tendered the agreed purchase price to defend-
ants.., and coupled his tender with instructions to defendants that he would not 'close the
transaction until the [d]efendants had agreed to said conditions' [not part of the parties'
agreement] .... the plaintiff repudiated the contract.").
143. See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (1989) ("[A] demand by one or both parties for more
than the contract calls for in the way of counter-performance is not in itself a repudia-
tion .... However, when under a fair reading it amounts to a statement of intention not to
perform except on conditions which go beyond the contract, it becomes a repudiation.");
see, e.g., Unique Sys., 622 F.2d at 376 (holding that the defendant, Zotos, "unequivocally
refused to perform" when its president "made it clear that Zotos would not ... agree to
purchase any systems until an extensive market test could be conducted in the field"-"a
requirement found nowhere in the contract"); Aero Consulting Corp. v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 867 F. Supp. 1480, 1491 (D. Kan. 1994) ("A refusal to perform except upon conditions
not required by the contract generally constitutes a repudiation.").
144. See, e.g., Ddcor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893,
899-900, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
J.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally 7A LAWRENCE,
supra note 89, at § 5-115:13; Leon, supra note 219, at 447.
145. See U.C.C. § 5-106(b) (1995) ("After a letter of credit is issued, rights and obliga-
tions of a beneficiary, applicant, confirmer, and issuer are not affected by an amendment
or cancellation to which that person has not consented except to the extent the letter of
credit provides that it is revocable or that the issuer may amend or cancel the letter of
credit without that consent."); U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1962) ("Unless otherwise agreed once an
irrevocable credit is established as regards the customer it can be modified or revoked only
with the consent of the customer and once it is established as regards the beneficiary it can
be modified or revoked only with the beneficiary's consent.").
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the Beneficiary. '1 46
In National Bank & Trust Co. v. J.L.M. International, Inc.,147 the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria contracted, on March 1, 1975, to buy 240,000
metric tons of concrete from JLM for a total contract price of
$14,400,000, plus shipping and demurrage (delay) charges. 148 Pursuant to
the contract's terms, Nigeria, through the Central Bank of Nigeria, ar-
ranged in early April 1975 for Morgan Guaranty to open an irrevocable,
transferable letter of credit in JLM's favor, and Morgan Guaranty noti-
fied JLM of the arrangement. 149 On September 30, 1975, while the letter
of credit remained in force, Morgan Guaranty notified JLM's assignee,
Interexporte, that Nigeria had unilaterally amended the letter of credit to
require prior approval for all demurrage charges. 150 Prior to the Septem-
ber 30 amendment, Interexporte entered into a charter party agreement
with Macia, whereby Macia agreed to provide transport for 180,000 met-
ric tons of concrete, with an option for the other 60,000 tons. In order to
secure the necessary vessels, Macia entered into a joint venture with
Natbank to finance use of the vessels Macia needed to satisfy its contract
with Interexporte. 151 When Natbank learned of Nigeria's amendment, it
sued. The court held, inter alia, that Nigeria's unilateral amendment to
the letter of credit, imposed without JLM's or Interexporte's consent, an-
ticipatorily repudiated the irrevocable letter of credit that Nigeria had
induced Morgan Guaranty to issue in JLM's (and then, by assignment,
Interexporte's) favor. 152
In Savarin Corp. v. National Bank of Pakistan,153 Savarin agreed to sell
6,000 tons of wheat to Sharbatly-3,000 tons each to be delivered to Jed-
dah and Dammam, Saudi Arabia-pursuant to which Sharbatly arranged
146. UCP500, supra note 1, art. 9(d)(i); see Dgcor by Nikkei, 497 F. Supp. at 906 (rely-
ing on a comparable UCP400 provision).
147. 421 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
148. Id. at 1270.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1271.
Notwithstanding the court's recitation that "Morgan [Guaranty] posted notification to
Interexporte that Nigeria had amended its letter of credit (#CBN/BO/75/50) so as to impose
the added requirement that demurrage payments would not be made unless the documents
specified in the original credit were from that time on certified for payment by Central
Bank" and that Nigeria's action "was apparently taken unilaterally without the consent of
the other parties to the irrevocable letter of credit," id. (emphasis added), it is not entirely
clear how an applicant (Nigeria) can unilaterally amend the terms of a letter of credit
between an issuer (Morgan Guaranty) and a beneficiary (JLM) or the beneficiary's as-
signee, Interexporte. The independence principle gainsays an applicant's ability to do so.
Perhaps a better characterization of the facts of this case is that Nigeria "compelled" Mor-
gan Guaranty to unilaterally amend its letter of credit without the prior consent of JLM's
assignee, Interexporte.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1272-73. Or, as discussed in supra note 150, the decision might be better
characterized as holding that Nigeria's insistence that Morgan Guaranty unilaterally
amend the letter of credit, without JLM's or Interexporte's consent, anticipatorily repudi-
ated the irrevocable letter of credit between Morgan Guaranty, as issuer, and Interexporte,
as JLM's assignee.
153. 447 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971).
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to have letters of credit issued in Savarin's favor by NBP.154 After receiv-
ing the letters of credit, Savarin wrote NBP on October 21, advising that
Savarin wanted to ship all 3,000 tons bound for Dammam on a single
vessel, rather than on three separate vessels as appeared to be called for
in the letters of credit, 155 and asked NBP to confirm that it would accept
a draft supported by shipping documents from a single lot rather than
three lots.156 On October 28, NBP indicated by cable that it would honor
such a draft. 157 Three days later NBP notified Savarin that it would only
honor Savarin's draft if the shipment arrived on three separate ships. 158
The Second Circuit held that NBP's October 31 refusal to honor any draft
from Savarin that did not indicate shipment on three separate vessels was
an anticipatory repudiation, because NBP had already agreed to amend
the letter of credit to permit shipment on a single vessel.159
On the other hand, refusing to amend a letter of credit to conform to
the desires of the parties to the underlying obligation, and then dishonor-
ing drafts that do not conform to the unamended letter, is not an anticipa-
tory repudiation of the letter of credit.
In B.E.I. International, Inc. v. Thai Military Bank,160 BEI agreed to
produce "hydra" rocket systems and sell them to the Royal Thai Army
(RTA). To secure the RTA's obligation to pay the $2,370,084 contract
price, Thai Military Bank (TMB) issued an irrevocable letter of credit in
BEI's favor. TMB also issued a "counterguarantee" in favor of RTA, in
the amount of $237,008.40, payable in the event that BEI failed to per-
form. BEI arranged for Worthen to issue an irrevocable standby letter of
credit in the same amount in favor of TMB. 161 Before Worthen's letter of
credit expired on November 23, 1988, Worthen agreed to extend its effec-
tive date until April 23, 1989, due to delays BEI was experiencing in ob-
taining the necessary U.S. export license.162 On March 23, 1989, TMB
made a timely demand for payment against the Worthen letter, but then
sent instructions eight days later asking Worthen to hold the demand
"pending further instructions.' 63 April 23 came and went with no more
154. Id. at 728.
155. The Second Circuit raised, and then avoided, the question of which of two sets of
letters of credit actually governed the transaction. The first set, which proclaimed them-
selves to be irrevocable, said nothing about the number of lots in which Savarin was re-
quired to ship the wheat. Id. at 729-30. The second set, which claimed to be "confirming"
the first, contained the language requiring multiple shipments. Id. at 730. The Second
Circuit ultimately found that NBP's insistence on a three-lot shipment repudiated its acqui-
escence to a single-lot shipment in response to Savarin's October 21 cable. Id. at 731.
However, it also suggested that the "confirming" letters of credit may have, themselves,
been repudiations of the original irrevocable letters of credit they purported to "confirm."
Id. at 729, 731.




160. 978 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1992).
161. Id. at 440.




word from TMB. On April 3, 1998 BEI notified Worthen that the letter
of credit had lapsed, and requested release of its collateral. On May 3,
1989, Worthen notified TMB that the letter of credit had lapsed and that
Worthen believed that TMB's March 23 demand had expired with it.164
In November 1989, BEI brought suit against Worthen and TMB to have
the letter of credit declared expired and to regain the collateral it had
given to Worthen. Worthen, in turn, urged TMB to acknowledge that its
rights under the standby letter of credit had expired. Instead, TMB wrote
Worthen on February 28, 1990 asking Worthen to extend the standby let-
ter of credit until September 30, 1990. Worthen did not respond to this
request, 165 nor did TMB renew its prior demand or make any other at-
tempt to draw against the letter of credit.
On appeal of the trial court judgment declaring, inter alia, TMB's
rights under the standby letter of credit to have expired, 166 TMB argued
that Worthen had anticipatorily repudiated its obligations under the
standby letter of credit when it wrote TMB in May 1989 and January 1990
declaring the letter of credit and TMB's March 23 demand expired. I67
The Eighth Circuit disagreed:
Prior to expiration, TMB by written notice invoked the extension
clause and extended the credit to April 23, 1989. When TMB failed
to give notice of a further extension prior to April 23, 1989, the letter
of credit expired. After expiration, TMB had no unilateral right to
revive Worthen's time-specific letter of credit commitment. Even if
the parties to the underlying contract intended that Worthen's letter
of credit should remain open for the life of TMB's counterguarantee
to RTA, the plain language of the letter of credit document is
controlling.
Because the letter of credit expired on April 23, 1989, the conten-
tions TMB raises on appeal are without merit. TMB claims that
Worthen repudiated the letter of credit in communications that came
after April 23, 1989. Obviously, there can be no anticipatory repudi-
ation of a contract that has already expired .... 168
B. READINESS, WILLINGNESS, AND ABILITY TO PERFORM
To the extent that a beneficiary must prove that she was ready, willing,
and able to perform or to tender performance, but for the issuer's repudi-
ation, how may she prove the requisite readiness, willingness, and ability?
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The district court held that TMB's February 28 letter unilaterally extended the
expiration date of the standby letter of credit until September 30, 1990. Id. at 442. How-
ever, because TMB did nothing else before September 30, 1990, the district court held that
the letter then expired. Id. The court of appeals disagreed that TMB's letter had the effect
the trial court attributed to it, holding, instead, that it had expired on April 23, 1989-the
extended expiration date to which Worthen had previously agreed. Id. at 443. Either way,
the standby letter had expired without a timely conforming demand by TMB.
167. Id. at 442.
168. Id. at 443.
2003] 2269
SMU LAW REVIEW
In D&or by Nikkei International, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,'69
the plaintiffs established they had the necessary arrangements in place to
procure and deliver the concrete that was the subject of the underlying
contract on or before the date on which delivery was due. 170 In Ross
Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 171 the plaintiff established that, but for
the issuer's repudiation, "it would have been in a position to ship
goods.., and present drafts for the amount of the balance of the letter of
credit."172
By contrast, in Clement v. FDIC,173 the beneficiary (Clement) was una-
ble to establish that it could make a conforming draft against the standby
letter of credit because, at the time the issuer's successor-in-interest
(FDIC) repudiated, there was, as yet, no breach of the underlying obliga-
tion entitling Clement to draw against the standby letter of credit.1 74
Likewise, in De Smeth v. Bank of New York, 175 De Smeth's predeces-
sor-in-interest (Dikarpa) contracted to sell leather garments to Samsung
for $890,448. Samsung opened an irrevocable letter of credit with the
Bank of New York to pay for the garments. The letter of credit estab-
lished shipping deadlines of January 20 and February 20, 1990 for differ-
ent styles of garments. By its terms, the letter of credit expired on March
11, 1990.176 Dikarpa failed to make any conforming shipments by the
agreed deadlines, and submitted two drafts after the letter of credit ex-
pired on March 11.177 The bank refused to honor a total of six drafts,
citing Dikarpa's late shipment as the reason for rejecting the first four
drafts and Dikarpa's failure to submit drafts before the letter of credit
expired as the reason for rejecting the final two drafts. 178
While agreeing with De Smeth that the transaction was subject to the
anticipatory repudiation provisions of Article 5, despite the letter of
credit being expressly subject to the UCP,1 7 9 the court found that De
Smeth had no claim for anticipatory repudiation because the six drafts
that Dikarpa presented to the bank "were discrepant and any additional
drafts that would have been presented would have been similarly discrep-
169. 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afTd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
170. Id. at 907-09.
171. 613 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
172. Id. at 539; see also Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225, 238 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1926) ("IT]he record establishes that respondent, on April 16, 1920, had a con-
tract in writing with a responsible corporation for the coal required to fulfill its contract
with the Ministry; the coal and ships were available, and the cargoes would have been
loaded at Hampton Roads before May 16th. Thus respondent was ready, willing, and able
to perform its contract by May 16th, well within the limit of 30 days after April 30th.").
173. 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1017 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
174. Id. at 1023-24.
175. 879 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
176. Id. at 14.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 15 n.1.
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ant since the letter of credit had expired." 180 Citing Ross Bicycles 81 for
the former's discussion of the independence principle, 182 the De Smeth
court went on to say that Dikarpa's readiness, willingness, and ability to
perform the underlying obligation was insufficient grounds to find that it
was ready, willing, and able to perform the letter of credit:
Plaintiff's argument that it need only show its ability to fulfill its obli-
gations on the underlying contract is rejected. The only contract
governing the relationship between the parties to this action is the
letter of credit, and it would be incorrect to look to the underlying
contract, entered into by different parties, in analyzing plaintiff's an-
ticipatory repudiation claim.183
The final part of the court's statement risks overbreadth. In many let-
ter of credit anticipatory repudiation cases-including Ross Bicycles, the
very case the court cites in support of its proposition-a beneficiary's
claim (or an issuer's defense) may well rest on the performance of one or
more parties to the underlying contract or on their readiness, willingness,
and ability to perform the underlying contract. 184 However, where, as in
De Smeth, the issues are non-conforming documents and expiration
(rather than cancellation or modification) of the letter of credit, perform-
ance of, or readiness, willingness, and ability to perform, the underlying
contract is (or may be) a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a
beneficiary seeking to recover under the theory of anticipatory
repudiation.
C. THE BENEFICIARY'S RECOURSE
Assuming that the issuer repudiated and that the beneficiary was (if it
needed to be) ready, willing, and able to perform any condition precedent
to its right to payment under the repudiated letter of credit, what re-
course is available to a beneficiary so wronged?
The version of Article 5 currently in effect in forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia,185 provides that a beneficiary whose issuer, before
presentation, repudiates its obligation to pay the beneficiary under the
letter of credit before presentation may "recover from the issuer the
amount that is the subject of the ... repudiation," plus incidental dam-
ages, interest "from the date of wrongful dishonor or other appropriate
date," and reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses of litigation in-
curred by the beneficiary in enforcing its rights against the repudiating
180. Id. at 15.
181. Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 613 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); see
supra notes 99, 171-72 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 27.
183. De Smeth, 879 F. Supp. at 15.
184. See, e.g., D6cor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893,
907-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 169-70), af)d, 647 F.2d
300 (2d Cir. 1981); Clement v. FDIC, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1017, 1023-25 (W.D. Okla.
1986) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 173-74); Ross Bicycles, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 539
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 171-72).
185. See supra note 36.
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issuer.186 If, before presentation, the issuer repudiates an obligation
other than to pay money, the beneficiary may obtain specific perform-
ance, or at the beneficiary's option, may recover the value of the issuer's
performance; and, in either case, the beneficiary may recover incidental
damages. 187 The beneficiary is not entitled to recover consequential, ex-
emplary, or punitive damages. 188 Nor is the beneficiary obligated to miti-
gate its damages caused by the issuer's repudiation. 189 However, if the
beneficiary undertakes to avoid some or all of its damages, any damages
186. See U.C.C. § 5-111(a), (d), (e) (1995); see, e.g., Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Concord
Bank, 248 F. Supp. 2d 867, 883-84 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (awarding the beneficiary the face value
of the letter of credit and prejudgment interest from the last date after presentation on
which the issuer could have timely honored the beneficiary's draft, and instructing the
beneficiary to submit detailed affidavits to enable the court to ascertain and award its rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11,
9 9.02[5]; 6B HAWKLAND & MILLER, supra note 37, [Rev.] § 5-111:1; 7A LAWRENCE, supra
note 89, [Rev.] §§ 5-111:6 to :11.
Former section 5-115(2) did not permit a beneficiary to recover attorneys' fees and litiga-
tion expenses unless its letter of credit with the issuer so provided. See 1 DOLAN, supra
note 11, 1 9.02[5][c] & n.147; 3 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 112, at 204 & n.6. It was
not enough for the underlying contract between the beneficiary and the applicant to pro-
vide for attorneys' fees and expenses. See 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 9 9.02[5][c] & n.148.
Because the UCP500, the ISP98, and the U.N. Convention are all silent with respect to
remedies for anticipatory repudiation (and, for that matter, remedies for wrongful dis-
honor), Article 5 governs the beneficiary's remedies for anticipatory repudiation notwith-
standing the parties' incorporation of one or more of the foregoing into their letter of
credit. See U.C.C. § 5-116(c); UCP500, supra note 1, art. 1; ISP98, supra note 10, R.
1.01(b); U.N. Convention, supra note 34, arts. 1(2), 21; cf Bank of Joliet v. Firstar Bank
Milwaukee, N.A., No. 96 C 1145, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15384, at *34-36 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 1997) (finding that, while the parties expressly incorporated the UCP500 into their
letter of credit, Article 5 would dictate the remedy for a beneficiary whose issuer wrong-
fully dishonored, because the UCP500 neither provides nor denies a remedy for wrongful
dishonor).
187. U.C.C. § 5-111(a). See generally 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89, [Rev.] § 5-111:14.
188. See U.C.C. § 5-111(a) ("[Tjhe claimant may also recover incidental but not conse-
quential damages."); see id. § 5-111 cmt. 4 ("Consequential damages ... are excluded in the
belief that these damages can best be avoided by the beneficiary or the applicant and out
of the fear that imposing consequential damages on issuers would raise the cost of the
letter of credit to a level that might render it uneconomic. A fortiori punitive and exem-
plary damages are excluded .... "); see, e.g., Amwest Sur., 248 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (quoting
U.C.C. § 5-111(a) & cmt. 4 en route to denying the beneficiary's claim for punitive dam-
ages); ITM Enters., Inc. v. Bank of N.Y., 754 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(affirming the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing a beneficiary's claim for
punitive damages because "[a] claimant under a letter of credit may recover the amount
that is the [subject] of the dishonor or repudiation, as well as incidental damages, but not
consequential or punitive damages"); see also D~cor by Nikkei, 497 F. Supp. at 911-12
(applying U.C.C. § 1-106(1) to justify refusing to award punitive damages, despite the ben-
eficiaries' claim that the issuer "maliciously" repudiated the letters of credit in their favor).
See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, $ 9.02[5][d].
A beneficiary may recover consequential damages, notwithstanding the general prohibi-
tion in section 5-111, if the letter of credit specifically provides for them. See generally 6B
HAWKLAND & MILLER, supra note 37, [Rev.] § 5-111:1.
189. U.C.C. § 5-111(a); see, e.g., Amwest Sur., 248 F. Supp. 2d at 883 ("A beneficiary...
has no duty ... to mitigate its damages; its damages are for the breach of its credit contrac-
tual relationship with the issuing bank and the appropriate measure of such damages is the
face value of the LOC."); see also, e.g., Optopics Labs. Corp. v. Savannah Bank of Nig.,
Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 898, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank Leumi, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Seiko Sporting
Goods, U.S.A. Co., 540 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 548 N.E.2d 1078 (I11.
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it avoids will reduce the beneficiary's recovery from the repudiating
issuer.19o
Former section 5-115-still the law of Wisconsin' 91-afforded a
nonrepudiating beneficiary who learned of the issuer's repudiation "in
time to reasonably avoid procurement of the required documents," the
"rights of a seller after anticipatory repudiation by the buyer under Sec-
tion 2-610."192 Applying section 2-610 would lead a beneficiary who
chose to respond to the issuer's repudiation by doing something other
than suspending its own performance and urging retraction to section 2-
703.193
Section 2-703, in turn, would entitle the nonrepudiating beneficiary to:
(1) sue the repudiating issuer for the face value of the repudiated draft or
letter-Article 5's surrogate for the contract price-plus incidental dam-
ages and interest;194 (2) resell the goods or services that were the subject
1989) (all finding no duty to mitigate damages under former Article 5). See generally 1
DOLAN, supra note 11, 1 9.02[5][b]; 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89, [Rev.] § 5-111:12.
190. U.C.C. § 5-111(a). See generally 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 1 9.02[5][a]; 7A LAW-
RENCE, supra note 89, [Rev.] § 5-111:12.
191. See supra note 36.
192. See U.C.C. § 5-115(2) (1962). See generally 6B HAWKLAND & HOLLAND, supra
note 37, § 5-115:1; 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89, § 5-115:11.
Treating the beneficiary as a seller whose buyer has repudiated poses a challenge when
dealing with a standby letter of credit for which the underlying obligation is a promissory
note or similar arrangement obligating, rather than a contract for the sale of goods or
services.
Section 5-115 unfortunately was drafted with only commercial letters of
credit in mind; therefore a problem arises in applying § 5-115 to standby let-
ters of credit: there are no goods for the beneficiary to resell when the issuer
dishonors a standby letter of credit. The question thus arises as to whether
the [issuer] should be permitted to prove that the beneficiary's actual dam-
ages are less than the amount of the draw or whether the bank is liable for
the full amount of the draw. Because one of the primary purposes of a
standby letter of credit is to put the proceeds in the hands of the beneficiary
pending resolution of the [underlying] dispute in court, courts should not
attempt to resolve the underlying dispute in the [beneficiary's] case [against
the issuer]. Hence, the damages for standby letters of credit should be the
full amount of the draw.
3 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 90, § 21.8.3 (footnotes omitted). While the foregoing
overgeneralizes by failing to recognize that the contracts underlying some standby letters
of credit are for the purchase and sale of goods or services, see supra note 12, it does point
out one of the reasons the drafters of Revised Article 5 may have chosen to remove the
reference to section 2-610 when they crafted section 5-111(a) to replace former section 5-
115(2).
193. See U.C.C. § 2-610(b) (1989).
194. See id. §§ 2-709, 2-710; see, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 599 F.
Supp. 592, 600-01 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (awarding the beneficiary of a $1.5 million letter of credit
$395,391.68-the amount of the draw the beneficiary attempted to make following the
issuer's repudiation), affd in part and rev'd in part, 785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1986); Ross
Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 613 N.Y.S.2d 538, 541-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (awarding
the beneficiary the as-yet unpaid balance of the face value of the letter of credit, plus
interest from the date the issuer anticipatorily repudiated); see also, e.g., Clement v. FDIC,
2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1017, 1031 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (having found that the beneficiaries
were not entitled to recover for anticipatory repudiation because they failed to establish
their readiness, willingness, and ability to perform but for the issuer's repudiation, see
supra text accompanying notes 173-74, nonetheless awarding the beneficiaries judgment
for the face value of wrongfully dishonored letters of credit, plus interest, less any amount
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of the letter of credit between the beneficiary and the issuer and sue the
issuer for the difference between the contract price promised by the ap-
plicant-in whose stead the issuer promised to pay, and then repudiated
that promise-and the price at which the beneficiary resold, plus inciden-
tal damages and interest, less expenses saved as a consequence of the
issuer's repudiation; 195 (3) sue the repudiating issuer for the difference
between the payment the beneficiary reasonably expected under the let-
ter of credit for its goods or other performance and their market price at
the time and place for tender, plus incidental damages and interest, less
expenses saved as a consequence of the issuer's repudiation; 196 or (4) if
awarding the nonrepudiating beneficiary its expectancy would be "inade-
quate to put the [beneficiary] in as good a position as performance would
have done," sue the repudiating issuer for the beneficiary's lost profit,
plus incidental damages and interest.197
Section 2-703 would also entitle the nonrepudiating beneficiary to can-
cel the letter of credit, 98 but it is unclear how that would benefit the
beneficiary, because the independence principle would not allow the ben-
eficiary to cancel its contract with the applicant based on the issuer's re-
pudiation, unless the contract between the beneficiary and the applicant
so provided. If the beneficiary had already procured the required docu-
ments, former section 5-115 entitled the beneficiary to recover the "face
amount" of the repudiated draft or letter, together with incidental dam-
ages and interest-the same remedy afforded to beneficiaries whose
presentations had been wrongfully dishonored. 199
There is no indication in either the prefatory note or the official com-
ments to Revised Article 5 that its drafters intended, in any way, to re-
the beneficiaries have received from third parties as a consequence of being released from
their obligation to the applicant).
195. See U.C.C. §§ 2-706, 2-710; see, e.g., Savarin Corp. v. Nat'l Bank of Pak., 447 F.2d
727, 731-32 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming the jury's award of $60,500 as compensation for the
difference between the contract price between the beneficiary and the applicant and the
price at which the applicant was forced to liquidate their wheat commitments following the
issuer's repudiation of the commercial letter of credit, plus incidental damages).
196. See U.C.C. §§ 2-708(1), 2-710.
197. U.C.C. §§ 2-708(2), 2-710; see, e.g., D6cor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of
Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 908-09, 911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (awarding two beneficiaries
whose issuer anticipatorily repudiated letters of credit in their favor the difference between
the price at which they purchased cement for purposes of resale to the applicant and the
contract price the issuer agreed to pay on behalf of the applicant, plus incidental damages
and interest), affd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster,
216 N.Y.S. 225, 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (holding under pre-Code common law that the
beneficiary was entitled to recover the difference between its contract price to sell coal
subject to payment by the letter of credit issuer and the price at which the beneficiary
procured the coal for export to the applicant).
198. See U.C.C. § 2-703(f).
199. See U.C.C. § 5-115(1) & (2) (1962); see, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v.
S. Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1978) (reversing judgment against beneficiary for
failing to comply with conditions that were not part of the letter of credit, and remanding
with instructions to award the beneficiary the amount of the dishonored draft-$125,000-
plus interest and any incidental damages the beneficiary could prove to the district court's
satisfaction). See generally 6B HAWKLAND & HOLLAND, supra note 37, § 5-115:1; 7A LAW-
RENCE, supra note 89, § 5-115:12; 3 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 102, at 208.
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duce the remedial options available to a beneficiary whose issuer
anticipatorily repudiates. Indeed, the prefatory note describes section 5-
111 as "expand[ing]" the remedies available to beneficiaries. 200 And, yet,
section 5-111 only explicitly affords a beneficiary a single measure of
compensatory damages: "the amount that is the subject of the ... repudi-
ation,"120' which is comparable to former section 5-115(2)'s granting a
beneficiary the functional equivalent of an action for price.20 2 Section 5-
111 makes no explicit provision for a beneficiary recovering the differ-
ence between the contract price of its goods or services and their resale
price,203 the difference between the contract price of its goods or services
and their market value at the time and place of tender,204 or the profits
lost by the beneficiary as a result of the issuer's repudiation.20 5 Nor have
the leading commentators opined on the effect of these omissions.20 6
The text of, and comments to, Revised Article 5 are also silent about
whether a beneficiary may demand adequate assurances from an issuer
who has given the beneficiary reasonable grounds for insecurity (or, for
that matter, whether a repudiating issuer may retract its repudiation
before the nonrepudiating beneficiary materially changes position or oth-
erwise treats the repudiation as final).
Former section 5-115(2) was arguably silent on these issues, too, pro-
viding only that the nonrepudiating beneficiary who learned of the is-
suer's repudiation prior to procuring the documents required to make a
conforming presentation had "the rights of a seller after anticipatory re-
pudiation by the buyer under Section 2-610."207 A seller's right to de-
mand adequate assurances of performance arises under section 2-609, not
section 2-610.208 Thus, a strict reading of the text of former section 5-
115(2) could lead one to the conclusion that, while a nonrepudiating ben-
200. Prefatory Note to U.C.C. Revised Article 5 (1995) ("The damages provided are
expanded and clarified. They include attorneys fees and expenses of litigation and pay-
ment of the full amount of the wrongfully dishonored or repudiated demand, with interest,
without an obligation of the beneficiary to mitigate damages."); see also 3 WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 102, at 210-11 (discussing the extent to which Revised Article 5 "restates,
clarifies and adds to" the remedies provided by former section 5-115 and the case law that
developed around it); Dellas W. Lee, Letters of Credit: What Does Revised Article 5 Have
to Offer to Issuers, Applicants, and Beneficiaries?, 101 CoM. L.J. 234, 261 (1996) ("Section
5-111 contains several remedial benefits to the beneficiary that are either new, or were not
clearly spelled out under prior law .... The composition of remedies in this section is
designed to achieve two important goals: (1) full compensation to the beneficiary in the
event of breach, and (2) to provide a strong incentive for the issuer to honor the letter of
credit when properly presented.").
201. U.C.C. § 5-111(a) (1995).
202. See supra text accompanying note 194.
203. See supra text accompanying note 195.
204. See supra text accompanying note 196.
205. See supra text accompanying note 197.
206. See 3 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 90, § 21.8.3; 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 9.02[5];
6B HAWKLAND & MILLER, supra note 37, [Rev.] § 5-111:1; 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89,
[Rev.] §§ 5-111:5 to :14; 2 QUINN, supra note 94, [Rev.] § 5-111; 3 WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 102, 210-11.
207. U.C.C. § 5-115(2) (1962); see supra text accompanying notes 192-98.
208. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1989); supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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eficiary was entitled, following a repudiation by the issuer that would sub-
stantially impair the value of the letter of credit to the beneficiary, to wait
a commercially reasonable time for the issuer to perform, urge the issuer
to retract its repudiation, sue the issuer for breach, and, in any event,
suspend his own performance-all rights granted under section 2-
610 2 9-the nonrepudiating beneficiary was not entitled to demand that
the issuer provide adequate assurances of performance before the benefi-
ciary resorted to section 2-610. Surely such a strict reading, however,
would have missed the drafters' intent. The official comments to section
2-610, read along with the text of and official comments to sections 2-609
and 2-611, clearly contemplate section 2-610 to be part of a tri-partite
whole made up of sections 2-609, 2-610, and 2-611.210 Isolating section 2-
610 from section 2-609, to the end of denying a nonrepudiating benefici-
ary the right to seek assurances from a repudiating issuer in the same
manner and under the same constraints as Article 2 allows a nonrepudiat-
ing seller the right to seek assurances from a repudiating buyer, gives the
nonrepudiating beneficiary fewer rights than Article 2 gives the
nonrepudiating seller. Similarly, isolating section 2-610 from section 2-
611-an even more difficult task given the explicit reference in the text of
209. See U.C.C. § 2-610; supra notes 69, 71-77 and accompanying text.
210. See U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (providing that "[a] contract for sale imposes an obligation
on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be im-
paired"-an obligation that would clearly be breached by anticipatory repudiation under
section 2-610); id. § 2-609 cmt. 2 ("[T]his section provides the means by which the ag-
grieved party may treat the contract as broken if his reasonable grounds for insecurity are
not cleared up within a reasonable time. This is the principle underlying the law of anticipa-
tory breach, whether by way of defective part performance or by repudiation." (emphasis
added)); id. § 2-609 cmt. 5 ("A failure to provide adequate assurance of performance and
thereby to reestablish the security of expectation, results in a breach only 'by repudiation'
under subsection (4). Therefore, the possibility is continued of retraction of the repudiation
under the section dealing with that problem, unless the aggrieved party has acted on the
breach in some manner." (emphasis added)); id. § 2-610(b) (allowing the nonrepudiating
party to "[r]esort to any remedy for breach" afforded by Article 2 even though he has
urged the repudiating party to retract); id. § 2-610 cmt. 1 (referencing section 2-609 as
"tak[ing] care of" the "problem of insecurity" before setting forth the test for anticipatory
repudiation); id. § 2-610 cmt. 2 ("[A] repudiation automatically results under the preceding
section on insecurity when a party fails to provide adequate assurance of due future per-
formance within thirty days after a justifiable demand therefor has been made." (emphasis
added)); id. § 2-611(1) (allowing the repudiating party, until its next performance is due, to
retract its repudiation "unless the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled or
materially changed his position"-both rights afforded the nonrepudiating party under sec-
tion 2-610(b)-or "otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation final"); id. § 2-
611(2) ("Retraction may be by any method which clearly indicates to the aggrieved party
that the repudiating party intends to perform, but must include any assurance justifiably
demanded under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-609)."); id. § 2-611 cmt. 1 ("The
repudiating party's right to reinstate the contract is entirely dependent upon the action
taken by the aggrieved party. If the latter has cancelled the contract or materially changed
his position at any time after the repudiation, there can be no retraction under this sec-
tion."); id. § 2-611 cmt. 2 ("[A]n effective retraction must be accompanied by any assur-
ances demanded under the section dealing with right to adequate assurance. A repudiation
is of course sufficient to give reasonable ground for insecurity and to warrant a request for
assurance as an essential condition of the retraction. However, after a timely and unambig-
uous expression of retraction, a reasonable time for the assurance to be worked out should
be allowed by the aggrieved party before cancellation." (emphases added)).
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section 2-610(b) to "urg[ing] retraction" 211-to the end of denying a re-
pudiating issuer the right to retract its repudiation before the
nonrepudiating beneficiary materially changes its position or otherwise
indicates that it considers the issuer's repudiation to be final in the same
manner and under the same constraints as Article 2 allows a repudiating
buyer the right to retract its repudiation before the nonrepudiating seller
materially changes its position or otherwise indicates that it considers the
buyer's repudiation to be final, gives the repudiating issuer fewer rights
than Article 2 gives the repudiating buyer. Such outcomes seem inconsis-
tent with distinguishing anticipatory repudiation from wrongful dishonor
as the drafters of former Article 5 chose to do by setting former section 5-
115(2) apart from former section 5-115(1) and as the drafters of Revised
Article 5 chose to do by recognizing a beneficiary's right to remedy when
''an issuer ... repudiates its obligation to pay money under a letter of
credit before presentation" as a basis for relief separate from a benefici-
ary's right to remedy when "an issuer wrongfully dishonors. '212
Reported case law on whether a beneficiary has the right to demand
adequate assurances from an issuer-and the more important corollary
right to treat an issuer's failure to provide adequate assurances following
a justified demand-is virtually nonexistent. What little exists suggests
that, at least under former Article 5, a beneficiary had the right to de-
mand assurances.213 Likewise, there is limited authority supporting the
beneficiary's right to urge the repudiating issuer to retract-and the is-
suer's much more important corollary right to retract prior to any act by
the beneficiary cutting off the issuer's right to retract.21 4 The leading
commentators are generally silent on the issues of adequate assurances
and retraction under both former section 5-115(2) and revised section 5-
111.215
211. U.C.C. § 2-610(b).
212. U.C.C. § 5-111(a), (b) (1995); see also id. § 5-111 cmt. 1.
213. Cf. Monter Joint Stock Co. v. Udruzena Beogradska Banka, 684 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("Plaintiff's present claim of anticipatory breach based on the
banks' failure to offer to honor the letter of credit once sanctions are lifted in the future is
improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and, in any event, is without merit absent
allegations or proof that plaintiff ever made the requisite demand for assurances of future
performance." (citing Norcon Power Partners v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705
N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1998))).
214. See Atari, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 599 F. Supp. 592, 601 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(holding that the beneficiary's presentation following the issuer's repudiation was "no
more than a further urging that [the issuer] retract its repudiation and perform under the
credit" and that, had the issuer at that point properly dishonored the beneficiary's draft as
nonconforming, the dishonor "would amount to ... a retraction of its prior repudiation"
because "[s]hould the issuer properly dishonor an attempted draw made subsequent to its
repudiation, it has performed under the credit and retracted its repudiation"), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1986).
215. See 3 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 90, § 21.8.3; 1 DOLAN, supra note 11, 9.02[5];
6B HAWKLAND & HOLLAND, supra note 37, § 5-115:1; 6B HAWKLAND & MILLER, supra
note 37, [Rev.] § 5-111:1; 7A LAWRENCE, supra note 89, § 5-115:13, :15 to :21; id. [Rev.] § 5-
111:5 to :14; 2 QUINN, supra note 97, [Rev.] § 5-111; 3 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 102,
at 208, 210-11.




The letter of credit is a useful tool that can facilitate a commercial
transaction by providing either a payment or financing mechanism or
by guaranteeing satisfactory performance....
In a sale of goods context, the seller/beneficiary can use the letter
of credit as collateral to finance production. Once the goods are
shipped, the seller is assured prompt payment upon presentation of
complying documents. Consequently, the seller avoids delays in-
curred in billing and collection of the purchase price. The buyer/
customer, on the other hand, avoids prepaying the entire amount of
the purchase prior to its shipment without any assurance of satisfac-
tory performance. Because the letter of credit mechanism permits
the buyer to specify that certain documents accompany the draft for
payment, the buyer can be reasonably assured that complying docu-
ments will signify adequate performance.
In a standby letter of credit, the beneficiary knows that a
creditworthy party will pay upon presentment of documents that
substantiate the claim of default or nonperformance. The customer
or "guaranteed" party benefits by not having to escrow the funds or
otherwise restrict the use of funds. 216
These advantages do not come without corresponding risks. Introduc-
ing a third party-the letter of credit issuer-to the transaction may allow
an applicant to enjoy the benefits of some transaction that it would other-
wise have to forego because of the erstwhile beneficiary's unwillingness
to extend credit to the applicant or to accept payment in a form, at a time,
or at a place that is less convenient to the beneficiary than promised by
the letter of credit. On the other hand, a third party who has no vested
interest in the underlying transaction may be more inclined than an inter-
ested party would be to repudiate its obligation.
An issuer's repudiation, at the very least, deprives the beneficiary of
the full benefit of her bargain, in that it forces her to rely on the
creditworthiness of an applicant who she deemed insufficiently
creditworthy in the first place, thus her decision to require the letter of
credit. And, if the beneficiary's initial estimation of the applicant bears
out, the beneficiary will suffer a real loss. 217
Neither 5-115, nor its Official Comment suggests ... how the anticipatory
repudiation rules of the sales act that involve[ ] a two-party relationship be-
tween seller and buyer are intended to apply to the three-party relationship
between seller-issuer-buyer, save to say that this "states the rights of the ben-
eficiary upon repudiation of the credit, both against the issuer and with re-
spect to any goods."
2 QUINN, supra note 94, § 5-115(A)(3) (quoting U.C.C. § 5-115 cmt. 2).
216. Leon, supra note 2, at 463.
217. If the issuer's repudiation comes before the beneficiary has fully performed, then
the applicant, too, may be injured by the issuer's repudiation, if the beneficiary views the
issuer's repudiation as a repudiation by, or at least reasonable grounds to demand ade-
quate assurances of performance from, the applicant. Revised Article 5 appears to afford
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For these reasons, Article 5 affords relief to a beneficiary whose issuer
clearly and unconditionally manifests its intent not to honor, or its inabil-
ity to honor, her conforming presentation when and as promised. How-
ever, given the widespread adoption of Revised Article 5 and its less
explicit anticipatory repudiation provision, it is unclear whether such a
beneficiary any longer has the choice of remedies she was granted by
former Article 5.218 Moreover, her right to justifiably demand adequate
assurances of performance and her issuer's right to retract its repudiation
at any time prior to her detrimentally relying on it, both of which are
express in Article 2 and were impliedly incorporated by former section 5-
115(2), seem even more tenuous than they were under former Article
5.219 Taken at face value, Revised Article 5 could be read to afford a
beneficiary whose issuer repudiates prior to the time its honor is due little
more (though no less) than a beneficiary whose issuer wrongfully dishon-
ors at or after the time its honor is due-no more than the right not to
have to prepare for and make a conforming presentation, only to have it
rejected by the issuer. If the drafters of Revised Article 5 intended other-
wise, or the courts who must apply Revised Article 5 think otherwise, the
time is ripe for more definitive guidance.
the applicant a remedy against the issuer in such a case. See U.C.C. § 5-111(b). However,
a discussion of the applicant-issuer relationship is beyond the scope of this article.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 186-206.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 207-15.
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